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HIGHLIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A study by NEA completed in April 1987 shows that a large scale (500 M W )  
geothermal development on the big island of Hawaii and the inter-island power 
transmission cable is economically infeasible. This updated report, utilizing 
additional information available since 1987, reaches the same conclusion: 
0 
0 
The state estimate of $W billion for development cost of the 
geothermal project is low and extremely optimistic. More realistic 
development costs are shown to be in the range of $3.4 to $43 billion 
and could go as high as $4.6 billion. 
Compared to alternative sources of power generation, geothermal can 
be l.7 to 24 times as costly as oil, and l.2 to l.7 times as costly as a 
solar/oil generating system. 
Yearly operation and maintenance costs for the large scale 
geothermal project are estimated to be 44.7 million, 72% greater than 
a solar/oil generating system. 
Over a 4Cbyear period ratepayers could pay, on average, between 13 
(172%) and 2.4 cents (33%) per kWh per year more for electricity 
produced by geothermal than they are currently paying (even with oil 
prices stabilizing at $45 per barrel in 2010). 
A comparable solar/oil thermal energy development project is 
technologically feasible, could be island specific, and would cost 2Wo 
to 4w0 less than the proposed geothermal development. 
Conservation is the cheapest alternative of all, can significantly 
reduce demand, and provides the greatest return to ratepayers. 
There are better options than geothermal. Before the State commits the 
people of Hawaii to future indebtedness and unnecessary electricity rate increases, 
more specific study should be conducted on the economic feasibility, timing, and 
f 
\ 
i 
. 
C 
magnitude of the geothermal project. The California experience at The Geyers 
points up the fact that it can be a very risky and disappointing proposition. The 
state should 
geot hermals 
it. 
demand that proponents and developers 
troubling questions before they make an 
provide specific answers to 
irreversible commitment to 
The state should also more carefully assess the potential risks and hazards of 
volcanic disturbances, the degree of environmental damage that could occur, the 
future demand for electricity, and the potential of supplying electricity from 
alternative energy sources, conservation and small scale power units. As we stated 
in the April 1987 study, to move ahead with rapid large scale geothermal 
development on Hawaii without thoroughly studying these aspects of its 
development is ill-advised and economically unsound. 
ii 
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INTRODUCTION 
In early 1989 the Pele Defense Fund requested that Northwest Economic 
Associates (NEA) update their 1987 economic analysis of the proposed Hawaii 
Geothermal Development And Inter-island Cable Transmission System Project. 
This report, the result of that request, once again compares the cost of building 
and operating 500 MW of geothermal power plants and a cable transmission system 
with the cost of building and operating 500 MW of oil-fired power plant generating 
capacity. This update also compares the geothermal project with a solar/oil hybrid 
generating system of the same size. The impact of energy conservation is also 
considered in terms of its potential as an energy resource and in its contribution to 
an energy development program for the state of Hawaii 
This report develops low and high cost estimates for the project. In a project 
laced with as much uncertainty as this, a single cost figure is of little value. A 
range of values which attempts to account for some of the uncertainty seems a 
more logical approach to cost estimation. 
Our cost estimates include costs which should have been considered in the 
February 1988 Decision Analysts Hawaii, Inc. report for the State, but were not. 
The most obvious being a standard project cost contingency. Other costs not 
considered in the State report but included in this report are: 
1) additional cost of the undersea cable to allow for slope changes on the 
sea floor, 
2) cost of constructing the cable laying vessel which does not yet exist, 
3) 
4) 
cost of helper vessels to assist in the cable laying, and 
adequate insurance or plant replacement costs. 
A cost that neither the State report nor this report includes, but one that 
may be very important, is the cost of designing or protecting the plants to deal 
with geologic hazards. The added cost of strengthening plants, designing them for I 
quick disassembly, or constructing protective barriers around them will be 
considerable. 
This report considers project costs as objectively as possible considering the 
great deal of uncertainty and high level of risk involved in the project. 
All costs are shown in 1990 dollars. 
Appenix C contains two criticisms of the February 1988 Decision Analysts 
Hawaii, Inc. report on the proposed geothermal project. 
i V  
THE GEOTElXRMAL PROJECT AS CURRENTLY 
ENVISIONED 
The basic project scenario is that 500 MW of geothermal power will be 
generated in the Puna District on the Island of Hawaii. The power will be 
transmitted by overhead cables across the island to its northern tip where it will 
enter a submarine cable for transmission across the Alenuihaha Channel to the 
Island of Maui. The power will then be carried by overhead transmission lines to 
the southwest corner of Maui where it will enter a second submarine cable and will 
be transmitted along the Auau Channel and across the Kaiwi Channel to the 
Island of Oahu for distribution to customers. Figure 1 shows the described route. 
This is the route that is used in our analysis. Distances and channel depths are 
shown in Table 1. 
The amount of geothermal power production envisioned for the project is 
on the order of 500 net MW (megawatts). Allowing for transmission losses (10%) 
and adequate power reserve, (20%) 600 gross MW must be proven to exist and 
developed to meet project requirements. 
The 500 net MW of power would be provided by a number of geothermal 
power plants located in the area of the East Rift Zone of Kilauea volcano (Figure 
2). The number of plants that will be required to produce the 500 net MW would 
either be ten 55 MW plants, twenty 275 MW plants, or some combination of the 
two proposed sizes. The distribution and location of the plants and their wellfields 
will be governed by the distribution and location of the resource, but since no 
proof has yet been established that the necessary 600 gross MW actually exists, no 
attempt has been made to show a likely plant distribution pattern. In conjunction 
with the power plants and wellfields are the transmission cables (overhead and 
underwater) and their associated facilities. A general list of the system 
components is found in Table 2. 
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Figure 1 
PREFERRED ROUTE 
FfDWC PROGRAM 
. -  
MOLOKAI 
PREFERRED ROUTE 
HDWC PROGRAM 
Source: HDWC Program, Preferred Route Analysis 
(May 1 9 8 6 ) .  
Source: HDWC Program, Preferred Route Analvsis (May, 1986). 
NEA 
Source: Alternative Approaches to the Legal, Institutional, and Financial 
Aspects o Developing an Inter-island Electrical Transmhion Cable System, 
State of (I awaii, Department of Planning and Economic Development, April, 1986 
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Table 1 
DXSTANCEANDDEPTIICHARAC'IXRISLICSI 
OF PREFERRED ROUTE, 
April, 1986 
Hawaii to Maui to Oahu 
Length 
From To Segment OWSUB KMMI 
Puna 
Keaau 
Kawaihae 
Mahukona 
Alenuihaha 
Alenuihaha 
Huakini Bay 
Ahihi Bay 
Waimanalo 
Keaau 1H OH 23 
Kawaihae 2H OH 129 
Mahukona 3H OH 23 
Alenuihaha 4H SUB 32 
Alenuihaha lA SUB 19 
Huakini Bay 1M SUB 16 
Ahihi Bay 2M OH 32 
Waimanalo 3M SUB w 
Aniani 10 OH 2 
Total Overhead 212 
Total Submarine 221 
Percentage Submarine = 51% 
Longest Submarine Run = 154 km 
Approximate Distance Within Depth Ranges 
For Submarine Portions 
14 
80 
14 
20 
12 
10 
20 
96 
3 
E31 
138 
-
Depth 
0-1800 1800-3600 3600-5400 5400-7200 Feet 
0-547 547-1094 1094-1641 1641-2188 Meters 
Segment 0-300 300-600 60-0.900 900.1200 Fathoms 
- - 4H 27 5 - 10 1 8 lA 
7 2 7 1M 
3M 144 u - - - 
Total 178 27 8 8 
Percent 805 122 3.62 3.62 
HDWC Program, preferred Route Analvsis (May, 1986). 
Alternative Approaches to the Le@, Institutional, and Financial 
Aspects of Developing an Inrer-island, Electrical Transmission Cable 
System, State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic 
Development, April, 1986. 
NEA 
Source: 
Figure 2 
AREA OF PROPOSED GEOTXERMAL FACILITIES 
\\\\ Geothermal Plant Location - Trpnsmission on Line Route 
Source: Volcanism In Hawaii, US. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1350. 
4 
Table 2 
CABLE SYSTEM FACILITIES 
A cable system’s facilities would consist, in the general order of sequence 
from the energy generation source, of the following components 
0 
The interconnection facilities (alternating current) to transmit the 
renewable alternate energy-generated electric energy from the power 
plants to the cable system’s converter station on the Island of Hawaii; 
The land-based converter station on the Island of Hawaii to convert 
alternating current (ac) to direct current (dc) for cable transmission; 
The overhead transmission line traversing the Island of Hawaii to the 
land-based cable termination facility, including an oil pressurization 
station; 
The submarine cable system to Maui; 
The land-based oil repressurization station on Maui; 
The submarine cable system to Oahu; 
A land-based cable termination facility on Oahu; 
The overhead hvdc transmission line from the cable termination 
facility to the converter station on Oahu; 
The converter station to convert dc to ac for interconnection to 
HECO’s grid system’ and 
The interconnection facilities to transmit electric energy from the 
cable to HECO’s grid system. 
NEA 
Source: AZternative Apprmhes to the Legal, Institutional, and Financial 
Aspects of Developing an Inter-island Electrical Transrnission.Cable 
System, State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic 
Development, April, 1986. 
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. 
THE COST OF THE GEOTHERMAL PROJECT AS 
CURRENTLY ENVISIONED 
In February, 1988, Decision Analysts Hawaii, Inc. (DAHI) submitted a report 
on the economic feasibility of the 500 MW geothermal project. It estimated the 
development cost at l.675 billion (1986) dollars. Actual bids on the project have not 
been made public but speculation in the news media places them at above the $3 
billion mark' If these estimates prove accurate, they show the DAHI cost estimate 
to be more than a billion dollars low. 
Table 3 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT COST COMPARISON 
25 Net M W  Plants PlantNYelIf ield Total 
Capital Cost Comparison (M$) Surface Facilities Wells Cables Cost 
Without Contingency: 
DAHI 1983 6622 600.0 4133 16755 
DAHI 199O$a 700.9 600.0 444.4 17453 
NEA 1- (low estimate) 984.6 675.0 s l . 4  222l.o 
NEA 1- (high estimate) ll04.6 900.0 s l .4  2566.0 
With 20% Contingency: 
DAHI l990$ 84U 720.0 5332 20943 
NEA 1990$ (low estimate) 1345.9 810.0 6735 2829.4 
NEA 1990$ (high estimate) m.9 1080.0 6735 326l.4 
With 20% Contingency & Replacement W e b  
DAHI 1990$ 84l.l 1440.0 5332 28143 
NEA 1- (low estimate) 1345.9 1620.0 6735 3639.4 
NEA 1- (high estimate) m7.9 2160.0 6735 4341.4 
* 
V Star-Bulletin, Special Report Geothermal-A Heated Issue, by Susan Manuel, January 
2, WJO. 
The l986 DAHI cost figures are brought up to 1990 levels using inflation rates 
calculated from indexes found in the Statistical Abstract of The United States, 109th 
Edition, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. The annual construction cost inflation rate used 
for plantlwell field surface facilities is L43% based on Handy-Whitman public utility 
indexes for electric light and power plant construction. The annual manufacturing 
cost inflation rate for the cable portion of the project is L83% based on the producer 
price indexes for machinery and equipment. 
21 
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NEA - GEOTHERMAL PROJECT COST ESTIMATES 
This section describes how the geothermal project cost figures were developed 
for use in the analysis. Costs were developed for the construction of 25 net MW 
and 50 net MW geothermal power plants, the manufacture and laying of 
submarine cable, and the construction of overhead transmission lines and 
associated facilities. In estimating this cost NEA used available information from 
various Federal, State and Private industry sources and reports, and have followed 
the route and system requirements found in the DAHI and previous NEA reports. 
GEOTHERMAL POWER PLANTS 
Costs were developed for two sizes of power plants, 25 net M W  (275 gross 
MW) and 50 net MW (55 gross W) The DAHI report uses 25 MW plants in its 
analysis but indicates that current conjecture is for ten 50 MW plants. To estimate 
power plant costs we used the CENTPLANT computer program. This program 
was created specifically for estimating geothermal development costs and is 
designed to estimate the capital costs of geothermal plant and wellfield surface 
facilities having 10 to 100 MW capacity. The estimates are based upon the 
temperature of the resource, its flow rate, and the location and difficulty of 
developing the resource. CENTPLANT was originally d oped by the Oregon 
Department of Energy with c nformation and engine 
by Bechtel National, Inc. A gram is available from the Oregon 
Department of Energy or the Bonneville Power Administration. 
The CENTPLANT program develops costs for the following components: 
Geothermal Power Plant 
Turbine inlet valves and straine 
Turbine and generator 
Condenser (surface type) 
Condensate S 
Cooling tow 
Circulating water pumps 
Main transformer 
Switch yard 
Process piping 
9 
Geothermal Power Plant - cont'd 
Plant electrical equipment 
Instrumentation and controls 
Site preparation 
Turbine and control building 
Balance of plant systems 
Construction labor 
Indirect field costs (temporary construction 
facilities, miscellaneous construction services, 
construction equipment and supplies, field office, 
preliminary checkout and acceptance testing, and 
startup). 
Wellfield 
Production wellpad piping and equipment downstream 
from wellhead shutoff valves 
Production wellpad instrumentation and controls 
Steam or hot water transmission pipelines 
Flash tanks (flashed steam plants only) 
Steam release facility 
Startup system for production wells (flashed steam 
plants only) 
Reinjection pumps 
Reinjection pipeline 
Reinjection piping and equipment 
Reinjection instrumentation and controls 
Wellfield electrical system 
Wellfield distributed digital automatic control system 
Construction labor 
Engineering, procurement, and construction management 
Indirect field costs 
Production and reinjection island development 
(clearing, grubbing, grading, etc.) 
On-site roads 
h m t s  Provided Bv Program - User 
H2S Abatement 
Permits and licenses 
Resource assessment and exploration 
Production, reinjection, and replacement wells 
Owner's engineering, administrative, and general costs 
Cost overrun contingency 
10 
Costs Not Included In Program 
Land or land use costs 
Research and development costs 
Power transmission lines beyond the AC/DC converter 
station 
The program generates low, mid and high estimates of costs based on built- 
in engineering factors provided by Bechtel National, Inc. and variable input 
assumptions provided by the user. The low range estimate does not account for 
reinjection wells which will be required in the proposed 500 MW project. 
Therefore, only the mid and high estimates are used in this report. The mid 
estimate is now referred to as the low estimate using injection wells. 
Input Assumptions 
Low Estimate (with injection wells) 
0 Site preparation and construction camp is required 
B k W h  electricity cost at plant 
0 10 miles AC transmission line 
0 $25 million in remaining resource assessment work 
0 $750,000 for various permits and licenses 
Wells produce at 4 MW per well 
0 Z/ l  Productionflnjection well ratio 
0 3/l well drilling success ratio 
0 100% production well replacement over life of the plant 
High Estimate (with injection wek) 
0 Site preparation and constructio 
M W h  electricity cost at plant 
10 miles AC transmission line 
0 $3 million in remaining resourc 
0 $1 million for various permits and licenses 
Wells produce at 3 MW per we1 
0 211 Productioflnjection well ratio 
3/l well drilling success ratio 
0 100% production well replacement over life of the plant 
Production wells are assumed be 6,000-7,000 feet deep and to cost $25 
million per well. Injection wells and drywells are estimated to cost $2.0 million per 
well. The same well costs are used as those found in the DAH1 report. See 
Appendix A for the range of well costs considered. 
11 
This study’s production to injection well ratio is 2 to 1. The DAHI report 
assumes a 267 to 1 ratio. Based on data for geothermal wells actually drilled in 
Japan appearing in the Geothermal Resources Council Bulletin of October 1989, a 
ratio of Ll to 1 was experienced For lack of better information our ratio rests 
comfortably between the two. 
The well drilling success ratio is 3 to 1, while the DAHI report assumes a 4 
to 1 ratio. The Japanese experience indicates a ratio of 24 to 1. The figure used in 
this study between the two. 
The well replacement rate is 100% over 20 years; the DAHI report rate is 
also 20 years. Recent reports from The Geysers in California, however, indicate 
that steam pressure in the wellfields is falling rapidly, and that well life may be 
only 10 to 15 years instead of the earlier predicted 20 to 30 years. If this proves true 
for Hawaii, the replacement rate may be 200% on more. 
Hydrogen Sulfide (H2S) abatement assumes the use of a Stretford system. 
The cost is based on a similar cost from The Geysers, Unit 21 abatement system. 
Unit 21 is 125 MW so the cost has been scaled down to 25 MW and 50 MW using the 
0.6 scaling factor found in the DAHI report and brought up to 1990 dollars. 
According to a 1985 review of a report estimating abatement costs for Hawaii, 
Thermal Power Company and Bechtel Group Inc, indicated that abatement costs 
in Hawaii will vary widely since the resource is so variable and will change over 
time. The estimated abatement costs reviewed by Thermal Power and Bechtel 
were based on a single set of assumptions and were characterized as being “at the 
extreme low end of published values for similar plants,” such as The Geysers Unit 
21. 
Based on this criticism and the assumption that geothermal fluids in Hawaii 
are at least as toxic and corrosive as those in California, the Unit 21 abatement cost 
figure is used as the low abatement cost for 25 MW and 50 MW plants. The costs 
are: 
- LOW Hiph 
Million $ 
25 MW 6.46 
50 MW 1034 
9.70 
1551 
12 
A 20% cost contingency is added to the plant/wellfield surface facilities, 
development costs and well drilling costs to cover unexpected costs and cost 
overruns. Using this contingency level is justified since it agrees with the 
difference between actual completed plant costs shown in Table 4 and the 
CENTPLANT generated estimates. Geothermal experts who have studied 
geothermal development costs agreed that 20% is probably the minimum 
contingency, while 30% may be more appropriate for a project as ambitious as the 
Hawaii project' 
The CENTPLANT generated estimate for dollars per gross kilowatt hour 
which NEA uses for a 25 net MW (275 gross MW) plant is 20% below the average 
actual cost per gross kilowatt hour of plants constructed in the 20 to 30 MW range. 
The DAHI report estimate is 52% below the average. For dollars per net kilowatt 
hour, the percentages are NEA 22% below and DAHI 55% below. 
Only one of the three plants listed, shows a construction time for building a 
geothermal power plant. The figure is higher than estimates of Stone & Webster 
Engineering Company of Denver, Colorado who estimate l2 months minimum 
construction time, and 24 months as an average? NEA uses the estimate of 12 
months, while the DAHI report estimates 7 months or less construction time per 
plant. 
Table 5 shows th ower plant capital costs estimated by NEA 
See Appendix B for more detail on the using the CENTPLANT program. 
CENTPLANT output. 
A comparison of NEA and DAHI total development costs for twenty 25 net 
MW power plants and their required wells is shown in Table 6. 
I I/ Alex Sifford, Geothermal Program Manager, Resource Development Division, 
I Oregon Department of Energy. 
I Oregon Department of Energy. 
I 
l 
Alex Sifford, Geothermal Program Manager, Resource Development Division, 
~ 
l3 
Table 4 
GEOTHERMAL PLANT COST COMPARISON 
Cnw Net Year Built Cost 1990 MolltlU 
Mega- Mqa- Cost SlGR W e t  SM SICR UNet C~nst. 
Time watts SM KW KW 1990s K W  KW Year watts 
Plants in 
ZI-~OMW R a n g 2  
Bear Canyon 1989 22om 348 l582 1740 353 1605 1765 
Roosevelt 1984 235 20.0 36.0 1532 1800 392 1668 1960 28 
West FordFlat 1989 29.7 27.0 47.0 l582 1741 47.7 1605 1766 
Plants in 
20-30MW Range 75.2 67.0 117.8 
1990 275 25.0 LOW 
1990 275 25.0 High 
(25MW)DAHI 1990 275 25.0 
Percent &low 
Average 
LOW 
High 
(2rmpI)NEA 
( W N E A  
(25Mw) NEA 
(u) NEA 
(UMW) DAHI 
l22.2 1625 1823 
373 1357 1493 12 
40.9 1488 16.6 12 
29.4 1068 1174 7 
20% 22% 
9% 11% 
52% 55% 
Alex Sifford, Oregon Department of Energy; in the report "Innovative Design of New Generating Plants; by 
Gordon Bloornqust, John Geyer, and Alex Sifford, produad by the Washington State Energy office for the Bonneville 
Power Administration, July 1989. 
Note: Construction costs were brought up to 1990 dollars using an annual construction cost inflation rate of l.43%. This rate 
is based on Handy-Whitman public utility indexes for electric light and power plant construction. Sce earlier footnote. 
Table5 . 
GEOTHERMAL POWER PLANT CAPITAL COST 
(1990 dollars) $million 
Plant S i  LOW High 
(Megawatts) Estimate Estimate 
25 
50 187.07 22719 
107.79 129.40 
Note: Includes initial wells, wellfield surface facilities, power plant, 
transmission lines, resource assessment, permits, licenses, 20% cost 
contingency. Does not include replacement wells. 
\ 
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Table 6 
COS" COMPARISON (M$) 
PLANTS AND WELLS 
Plan WellField 25 Net MW Plants 
Cost Comparison @I$) Surface Facilities Wells Total 
Without Conthgenw. 
DAHI 1986% 662.2 
DAHI 1990$ 700.9 
984.6 
1104.6 
- -  
DAHI 1990% 
NEA 1990% (low estimate 
With 20% Contingency: 
8411 
1345.9 
m 9  NEA 1990% (high estimate) 
600.0 12622 
0 . 0  l300.9 
675.0 1659.6 
900.0 2004.6 
720.0 
810.0 
1080.0 
ls6l.l 
w59 
2587.9 
With 20% Contingency & Replacement 
Wells 
DAHI 1990% 84l.l 1440.0 228w. 
13459 1620.0 2%59 
l.5072 2160.0 36679 
r 
Note: The 1986 DAHI cost figures are brought up to 1990 levels using inflation rates 
calculated from indexes found in the Sratisricd Abstract of The Unired States, 
109th Edition, U.S. Dept. of Commerce. The annual construction cost inflation rate 
used for plant/well field surface facilities is L43% based on Hand -Whitman public 
manufacturing cost inflation rate for the cable portion of the project is L83% based 
on the producer price indexes for machinery and equipment. 
utility indexes for electric light and power plant construction. T E e annual 
d in this project must be able to withstand the 
ures at deep depths, tidal flows, 
and difficult terrain, and the 
corrosive nature of sea water all combi make the design and construction of a 
reliable cable system a formidable ta owever, there are in operation fully 
functional and s around the world, and although 
the Hawaii Cable Project proposes to install its cable system at deeper depths than 
15 
any of the others, there is little doubt that the design and engineering can be 
accomplished. The question, is at what cost? 
Table 7 gives a basic description of the type of cable thought to be needed 
for the cable project, and Figure 3 shows its design characteristics in cross section. 
This specially designed oil containing, pressurized cable would be used for the 42 
mile length between Hawaii and Maui (see Table 1, Segments 4H, lA, 1M). 
The 96 mile length from Maui to Oahu (Table 1, Segment 3M), in shallower 
less treacherous water, will use a combination of solid cable with single and double 
armored lengths. This cable scenario is in agreement with that proposed by the 
Pirelli Cable Corporation and found in the DAHI report. 
Notes on the cable calculation: 
1. 
2 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
The costs of cable manufacturin are from Pirelli Cable Corporation 
are brought up to 1990 do P lars using a 183% per year inflation factor. 
See Table 3, footnote 2 
The cost of oil pressurization stations is from Pirelli Cable 
Corporation as found in the DAHI report. The costs are in 1986 
dollars. These costs are brou ht up to 1990 dollars using a 183% per 
An allowance for slope and bend for the undersea distances is 20% for 
the Hawaii-Maui segment and 5% for the Maui-Oahu segment. 
Cost of the cable laying vessel, which will have to be constructed, is 
from William Bonnet, Hawaii Deep Water Cable Program Manager, 
in a letter to Nelson Ho, March 10,1987. The 1987 figure is brought u 
to 1990 dollars using a 228% per year inflation factor. (US. Bureau o 
Labor Stat is t ics, Producer Price Index for transportation equipment). 
as found in the DAHI re ort. T % e cost is in 1986 dollars. These costs 
year inflation factor. See Ta % le 3, footnote 2. 
P 
We assumed two helper vessels will 
cable. We base this assumption on 
Geothermal Resources Council Bulletin, 
which described the deepwater cable 
vessel itself, the mother ship of the 
and examine the cable, and a monitoring and evaluation vessel to 
keep track of ocean currents is required in the operation. 
The cable laying costs and timetable are approximations from the 
DAHI report. 
16 
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Table 7 
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF THE PREFERRED CABLE 
The cable that is currently being evaluated is a self-contained oil-filled (SCOF) cable, 
with a 300 kVdc voltage, capable of a total transmission load of 250 megawatts (MW) of 
electric energy? It is 4.7 inches (119.5 mm) in diameter and weighs 24.46 lbs. per foot (36.4 kg 
per meter) in air and 1734 Ibs per foot (25.8 kg per meter) in water. The current estimated 
cost of manufacturing the cable is approximately $280 per yard ($9333 per foot) of cable 
($306 per meter) 
Selected Basic Design Characteristics 
of Cable Design No. 116 
Cable Type 
Voltage 2300 KVDC 
Conductor Cross Section 
Total Transmission Load mMW 
TrpnsmisSion Load Per Cable mMW 
Rated Current Per Cable 
Conductor Material Aluminum 
Oil Duct Diameter 
oil Typc 
Number of Cables for System 
Polarity Revcrsa! AUowed 
Canductor Diameter 
Insulation Thickness 
Cable Finished Diameter 
Cable Weight in Air 
Cable Weight in Water 
Maximum Oil Feeding Length 
Losses at Rated Current Per Cable 
Pulling Tension for 7,000 Ft Water Depth 
(Bascd on PCC Formula) 
Maximum Allowable Cable Pulling Tensi 
Corresponding Maximum Water Dcpth 
(Based on PCC Formula) 
Minimum Allowable Bending Diameter 
During Installation: 
SCOF (See Figure 1) 
I,W sq mm‘(2.48 sq in) 
833 Amps 
25 mm (0.98 in) 
High Density Synthetic Low Viscodty 
2 plus one spare 
522 mm (2.06 in) 
10.1 a m  (0.4 in) 
1195 mm (4.70 in) 
344 kg/m (24.46 Iblft) 
25.8 kg/m (1734 Ib/fr) 
190 km (118.1 mi) 
124 kW/km 
651 mt (718 t) 
78.7 mt (86.8 t )  
2,626 m (8,6l!U ft) 
a-Without Tension 
b-With 7,000 Ft pulling Tension 
c-With Maximum Allowable Pulling Tension 
7.0 m (229 ft) 
ll.6 m (38.06 ft) 
l2.0 m (2937 ft) 
s 
y Thisinformationhas 
Source ParsonsHawaii, ( A m  1985). 
p. 4-3 
Ece “Alternative Approaches to the Legal, Institutional, and Finandal Aspects of Developbg an 
Inter-island Electrical Transmission Cable System,” State of Hawaii. Department of Planning 
and Economic Development, April, 1% \ 
F i i e  3 
TYPICAL SCOF CABLE CROSS SECTION 
(Dimensions Based on Cable Design Case No. 116) 
OUTSIDE DXRXETZR = U9.5 m (4.70 in) 
Pirelli e b l e  C O ~  HDWC Rogram, October 12,1983. 
”Alternative Approaches to the Legal, Institutional, and Financial ktpcas of Developing an Inter-island 
Electrical Transmission Cable System,” State of Hawaii, Department of Planning and Economic 
Development, April 1986. 
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CABLE MANUFACRJRING COST: 
Hawaii-Maui 
3 Cables 
42 miles 
126 cable miles 
20% slope correction factor 
1512 total cable miles 
(1986) 85.00 dollars per foot 
(1990) 9U9 dollars per foot 
(1986) &W,W oil pressurization stations 
(1990) $72,959,927 cost for cable 
(1990) $6,45l,404 oil pressurization stations 
(1990) $7!2,4u31 total for cable & 
oil stations 
Maui-Oahu 
3 cables 
% miles 
288 cable miles 
5% slope & bend correction factor 
3024 total cable miles 
(1986) 8125 dollars per foot 
(1990) 8736 dollars per foot 
(1990) $139,485,266 cost for cable 
Total Hawaii-Maui-Oahu with 
20% Cost Contingency Factor 
(1990) $262,67596 Total Cost For Both Cables 
CABLE LAYING COST: 
Vessel Construction 
(1987) $17,6CO,W 
(19901 $18,83l,4% 
Vessel Operation Costs Per Day 
S40,W Main Vessel (1990) 
Sl5,ooO Helper Vessel (1990) - -  
Hawaii-Maui 
3 Cables 
42 miles 
126 cable miles 
20% slope & bend correction factor 
l5l.2 total cable miles 
0.33 cable miles per day 
458 days to lay cable 
I $18,327,273 Cost of Main Vessel $13,745,455 Cost of Helper Vessels (2) I I I 
Maui-Oahu 
3 cables 
96 miles 
288 cable miles 
5% slope & bend correction factor 
3024 total cable miles 
050 cable miles per day 
605 days to lay cable . 
S24J92,CK)O Cost of Main Vessel 
$18,l44,W Cost of Helper Vessels (2) 
291 Years to lay cable 
Total Hawaii-Maui-Oahu with 
20% Cost Contingency Cost 
(1990) S374364J84 Total Cost Manufacture, Delivery, and 
(1990) Slll@8,268 Tot ost To Lay Both Cables 
’ 
Laying of Submarine Cable and Facilities 
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Overhead Transmission Lines and Facilities 
There will be 108 miles of DC (direct current) transmission line on Hawaii 
(Table 1, Segments lH, 2H, 3H), 20 miles on Maui (Table 1 Segment 2M), and 3 miles 
on Oahu (Table 1, Segment 10). There will also be a need for new AC transmission 
lines to connect from the converter stations to the existing grid on Oahu. We 
estimate this length at 15 miles. 
Overhead Transmission Lines and FaciIities: 
2 
$lSo,ooo,ooo 
$24o,OOO 
108 
20 
3 
2 
262 
$6WO?W 
KW 
Cost Per Kilowatt 
Cost For Termination Facilities 
and ACDC Conversion Stations 
Stations 
Total Cost For Termination Facilities 
and AC/DC Conversion Stations 
Cost/mile Overhead DC Transmission Lines 
Miles Hawaii 
Miles Maui 
Miles Oahu 
Lines 
Total Miles 
Total Cost Overhead DC Transmission Lines 
Cost/mile Overhead AC Transmission Lines 
Miles Hawaii 
Total Cost Overhead DC Transmission Lines 
Cost Contingency Factor 
Environmental Impact Statement 
(1990) $298,936,000 Total Cost For Overhead Transmission Lines 
and Facilities with 20% Cost Contingency 
Notes on the transmission facilities calculation: 
1. The cost of AC and DC transmission lines is from Bonneville Power 
Administration (BPA) engineers in Portland, Oregon. The cost for 
AC transmission lines is more than for DC transmission lines because 
AC transmission requires three cables instead of two as is the case for 
DC. This third cable requires that the towers be larger and the right- 
of-way wider for AC than for DC. 
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2. Two AC/DC conversion stations and termination facilities will be 
required for the project. One will be located at the source of power 
eneration on Hawaii and the other on Oahu where the DC power 
bnes join the AC power distribution grid BPA en ineers estimate 
that a termination and conversion facility for a sd MW system using 
solid state converters and state of the art switchin gears and 
transformers will cost between $80 million and $1 0% million. (B.C. 
Hydro engineers estimate the cost at closer to $125 million per station.) 
A comparison of NEA and DAHI total costs for submarine and overland power 
transmission cables and facilities is shown in Table 8: 
Table 8 
COST COMPARISON (M$) 
TRANSMISSION CABLES AND FACILITIES 
~~ 
Total Cost All Cable & Overhead 
No cost contingency 
No cost for cable laying vessel 
No slope or curvature allowance for cable 
Total 
DAHI 1986 $ $4133 
DAHI 1990 $ $444.4 
With 2Wo cost contingency 
No cost for cable laying vessel 
No slope or curvature allowance for cable 
$5332 
With 2Wo cost contingency 
Includes cost for cable laying vessels 
Includes slope and curvature allowance for cable 
NEA 1990 $ $6735 
A comparison of NEA and DAHI total project development costs for 
twenty 25 net MW plants is shown in Table 9: 
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Table 9 
PROJECT DEVELOPMENT COST COMPARISON 
25 Net MW Plants 
Cost Comparison (MS) 
PlantIWell field Total 
Surface Facilities Wells Cables Cost 
Without Contingency 
DAHI l986$ 
DAHI 1990$ 
NEA 1- (low estimate) 
NEA 199Q$ (high estimate) 
With 20% Contingency 
DAHI 1- 
NEA 1- (low estimate) 
NEA 1- (high estimate) 
With 20% Contingency & Replacement 
Wells 
DAHI 1990$ 
NEA 1990$ (low estimate) 
NEA 1990$ (high estimate) 
662.2 
700.9 
984.6 
ll04.6 
WLl 
1345.9 
1507.9 
84Ll 
l3459 
l507.9 
600.0 4133 1675.5 
600.0 444.4 17453 
675.0 5614 222LO 
900.0 5x4 2566.0 
720.0 533.2 20943 
810.0 6735 2829.4 
1080.0 6735 32614 
1440.0 533.2 28143 
1620.0 6735 3639.4 
2160.0 6735 43l.4 
mA Pro-kt CaDital Cost Estimate 
20% Contingency 
Includes Replacement Wells 
(1990 Dollars) 
(20)25 net MW plants 
Low $3.64 Billion 
High $434 Billion 
Low $335 Billion 
High $4.03 Billion 
(low net MW plants 
,NEA Proiect Capital Cost Estimate 
30% Contingency 
Includes Replacement Wells 
(1990 Dollars) 
(20)25 net MW plants 
Low $389 Billion 
High $4.65 Billion 
Low $356 Billion 
High $430 Billion 
(10)50 net MW plants 
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IWA - OIL AND SOLAR/OIL POVVER PLANT COST 
ESTIMATES 
I 
i 
OIL PLANTS 
The capital cost for the oil fired power plants used in this analysis is $800 per 
kilowatt in 1990 dollars. This figure was derived from two sources. The 1986 
preliminary report from Decision Analysts Hawaii, Inc. uses a figure of $752 per 
kilowatt for its oil fired power plants. This figure is in 1986 dollars. The California 
Energy Commission in its October 1988 Energy Technology States Report cites the 
figure $750 per kilowatt in 1985 dollars. The average of both these figures in 1986 
dollars is $756 per kilowatt. Bringing this figure up to 1990 dollars using the L43% 
annual inflation factor from the Handy-Whitman public utility index for electric 
light and power plant construction costs gives us a base capital cost of $800 per 
kilowatt. Using this base cost we calculated the total cost per 100 net MW plant as: 
~ 
This is the oil plant capital cost used in the analysis. 
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$OLAR/OIL P LANTS 
The cost for a solar/oil fired combination (hybrid) power plant comes from 
Luz International, a builder and developer of solar thermal electric power plants. 
Luz International operates the largest solar facility ever built (200 MW in the 
Mohave Desert region of Southern California) and the source of an estimated % 
of the worlds solar electricity. Luz supplies solar thermal generated electricity to 
the Southern California Edison power company. Their system is described below? 
Luz’s Solar Electric Generaring Systems (SEGS) use trough mirror assemblies 
that individually track the sun by way of sophisticated microprocessors and 
highly precise sun-sensing instruments. The mirrors reflect sunlight onto 
stainless steel heat collecting pipes covered with a customdesigned absorptive 
coating. 
Inside the pipes, a heat transfer fluid ( a synthetic oil) absorbs and transports 
the thermal energy to a conventional boiler, which converts water to steam. 
The steam is then superheated with additional solar thermal energy and 
powers a steam turbine generator connected to the utility’s power grid On 
cloudy days or during evening hours, steam is generated by a natural gas 
boiler that runs the same turbine. The system can also operate in a hybrid 
mode, using both solar thermal heat and natural gas to generate steam from 
two separate boilers to run the common turbine. 
The natural gas boiler is available to power the turbine generator in order to 
ensure uninterrupted power during peak demand periods. This makes solar 
thermal plants more reliable, and therefore more attractive to utilities, 
according to Luz, because they can guarantee power at all times. 
Representatives from Luz International2 indicated that a hybrid solar/oil 
generating facility similar to the soladgas facilities now operating in California 
was a possible power generation option for Hawaii. The cost of the facility would 
be higher in Hawaii since the solar radiation availability (insolation) is lower. For 
example, the average annual mean daily solar radiation based on four collection 
stations in Southern California is about 1850 BTU’s per square foot? In Hawaii the 
- 1! Power Surge The Status and Near Term Potential of Renewable Energy Technologies, By 
Nancy Rader, for the Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy Project, May 1989. 
Phone conversation with Howard Hampton, Luz International, LTD, February, 1990. - 2/
- 3/ The solar availability figures (insolation) come from the US. Dept. of Energy 
publication Znput Data for Solar System, by V .  Cinquemani, J.R. Owenby Jr, and RG. 
Baldwin, November 1978 
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average annual mean daily solar radiation available, based on four collection 
stations, is about 1550 BTU's per square foot. Consequently, more solar collector 
surface area would be required in Hawaii to collect the same amount of available 
energy as in Southern California. Since solar collectors are the major component 
of the solar facility the cost would increase accordingly. Below is a comparison 
that shows the estimated difference in cost between a 100 net MW solar/oil plant 
built in Southern California based on Luz International cost estimates' and a 100 
net MW plant built in Hawaii. 
COMPARISON OF SOLAWOIL PLANT COSTS 
CALIFORNIA/HAWAII 
Qlifornia 
solar costs 100 net MW California 
btu/sq. f t  insolation 
3,413,000 btu per MW 
l,845 sq. ft collector to capture 1 
gross MW 
110 gross MW 
gross MW 
202,935 sq. ft. collector for 110 
0 3  conversion efficiency 
579,815 sq. ft. collector for 110 
gross MW 
&988 S k W  for solar collectors 
377 Yfor sq. ft. solar collector 
218,680,W S for solar collectors 
250 S for common generator 
2238 S kW for solar component 
550 kW for oil component 
2,788 S kW for solarloil plant 
Hawaii 
solar costs 100 net MW Hawaii 
&550 btdsq. ft insolation 
3,4l3,000 btu per MW 
4345 sq. f t  collector to capture 1 
gross MW 
110 gross MW 
242,213 sq. ft. collector for 110 
035 conversion efficiency 
692,037 sq. ft.  collector for 110 
gross MW 
gross MW 
2J73 S/kW for solar collectors 
377 $/for sq. ft. solar collector 
26l,005,l6l S for solar collectors 
250 S for common generator 
2,623 S kW for solar component 
550 kW for oil component 
3173 S kW for solar/oil plant 
11 Northwest Power Planning Council, Staff Issue Paper 89-46, Solar Electric Resources, 
November, 1989. 
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a 
Using this base cost we calculated the total cost per 100 MW soladoil hybrid 
power plant a s  
$3173 
ll0 
per kilowatt base capital cost 
gross MW plant size (lo0 net MW + lwo loss 
allowance) 
plant base cost (110 MW) 
cost contingency 
plant cost with contingency 
miles transmission line 
cost per mile 
cost per 10 miles 
cost contingency 
transmission line cost 
total plant cost 
This is the solar/oil plant capital cost used in the analysis. 
In the analysis it is assumed the solar component of the plant contributes 
30% of the total power output. The oil component provides 70%. 
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NEA - GEOTHERMAL PROJECT HAZARD ASSESSMEN" 
The island of Hawaii is the product of volcanic eruptions that have occurred 
over millions of years. Eruptive activity is currently occurring and as stated by the 
authors of a recent UAGS. Publication:' 
"Similar eruptions have continued into historical time on the islands of 
Hawaii and Maui and undoubtedly will occur in the future, especially on 
Kilauea and Mauna Loa Volcanoes. Most Hawaiian eruptions form lava 
flows that endanger chiefly property; explosive eruptions are relatively rare 
but are more likely to threaten people. As intensive land development 
expands toward areas of relatively high hazard, the threat to life and 
property will increase accordinelv." 
The current eruption which began in 1982 and has continued through the 
present, has covered well over l2,OOO acres and caused damages of more than $11 
million. It is the same erup which completely covered what was to have been a 
geothermal development and prompted a land exchange with the state, 
insuring geothermal proponents the pursuit of their development objective. 
Figure 4 shows the five major volcanoes that make up the island of Hawaii. 
Of the five, the two most active are Mauna Loa and Kilauea. Tables 10 and 11 list 
the eruptive activity that has occurred on Mauna Loa and Kilauea Volcanoes in 
the recent past. Kilauea has recorded 65 eruptions in the last 233 years and has an 
eruption interval of about 35 years. Mauna Loa has had 37 eruptions in 152 years 
averaging 4 years between eruptions. Kilauea, currently erupting, is the most 
s shown in Figures The type and pattern of its volcan 
Areas along the faults and rifts of Kilaue 
potential volcanic activity ave been identified by type and level of hazard 
(Figures 8 and 9) From information the US.G.S. has collected, it has developed a 
series of hazard zone maps and describes them in the following manner: 
11 ' Vofcunism in Hawaii, Chapter 22, U.S. Geological Survey Professional Paper l350,1986. 
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Source: 
Figure 4 
MAP OF THE ISLAND OF HAWAII, SHOWING THE 
FIVE MAJOR VOLCANOES THAT MAKE UP THE ISLAND, 
AND THE HISTORIC LAVA FLOWS. 
156. N 155. 
20  
Volcanoes in the Sea, The Geology of Hawaii, Gordon A. Macdonald and 
Agatin T. Abbott, 1970. 
Table 10 
VOLCANISM IN HAWAII 
Historical Eruptions of Mauna Loa Through May, 1985 
1832 
I843 
1849 
1851 
1852 
1855 
1859 
1865 
1868 
1871 
1872 
1873 
1873 
1875 
1875 
1876 
1877 
1880 
1880 
1887 
1892 
18% 
1899 
1903 
1907 
I914 
1916 
1919 
1926 
1933 
1935 
1940 
1942 
1949 
1950 
I975 
1984 
; (b 
15 
21 
21 
4so 
300 
120 
16 
30 
60 
2 *I 
547 
30 
7 
1 
11 
6 
280 
IO 
3 
16 
23 
60 
15 
48 
14 
42 
15 
145 
23 
1 
22 
wdm 
NonhaJt rift 
wdm 
wdm 
Southwest rift 
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Bngham, 1909. p 63-65; Hitckck, 
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Brigham, 1909, p 6 8  Hitchcock, 1909. 
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1909, p 116. 
1909, 116-h9. 
Bnghaui. 1909. p. 185. 
Bnghtm, 1909, p 192-1% Hitchcock, 
1909, p 128-130. 
Brigham, 1909, p 196-199, Hitchask, 
Briphrm, 1909, 165-168; Hitchbmk, 
1909, p 123-$27. 
1909, p 132-138. 
1909. p 138-139. 
B r i m ,  1909, p 202-204; HitChC*Xk. 
Briphrm. 1909, p 206-209; Hitchcock, 
agfflz 1947, 
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F ’ I h 7 ,  142-146. p E. 
Ault, 1965, p 7. 
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29 
. 
Table ll 
VOLCANISM IN HAWAII 
Historid Eruptions of Kiiauea Through May, 1985 
1823 
1823 
1832 
1840 
1868 
1868 
1877 
1877 
1884 
1879 
1882 
I888 
1892 
1918 
1919 
1921 
1919 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1924 
1927 
1929 
1929 
1930 
‘ 1931 
1934 
1952 
1954 
1955 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1963 
I965 
1965 
1967 
1968 
7 
17 
11 
13 
2 
4 
19 
14 
33 
136 
3 
88 
36 
36 
I 
22 
7 
3 
2 
2 
1 
10 
1 
251 
5 
Eastrimofcaldaa 
East rift 
I;iLuea Iki 
Southwest rift 
C d d m  dl 
East rift <submarine) 
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VOLCANISM IN HAWAII 
Historical Eruptions of Kilauea Through May, 1985 
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Source: Volcanism In Hawaii, US. Geological Survey Professional Paper 1350. 
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Figure 5 
TYPE OF ERUPTIVE BEHAVIOR OF KILAUEA VOLCANO 
EXPLANATION 
l Y P E  OF ERUPTION 
Ezplorivc 
Brief 
Sustained. unstable 
r 0 Susmfncd. stable 0 10 20 KILOMETERS 
I 
B 
Source: Volcanism In Hawaii, US. Geological Survey Professional Paper l.350. 
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Figure 6 
KILAUEA VOLCANO SHOWING THE LOCATION OF 
THESUMMITCALDER&TWOACTJVERIETZONES, 
THE KOAE AND HILINA FAULT SYSTEMS, AND 
THE LOCATION OF HISTORIC ERUPTIONS ON 
TRERIFruINEs. 
THE SUMMIT CALDERA FLOOR IS COVERED BY 
LAVAS ERUPTED BETWEEN 1885 AND 1982. 
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Figure 7 
ERUPTIVE HISTORY AND LONG-TERM BEHAVIOR ‘OF KILAUEA VOLCANO 
Structure of Kilauea 
A. Mapped structures, simplified from Holcomb (198Ob). 
B. Structural subdivisions, modified from Swanson and others (lP76a). 
\ 
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"The hazard-zone maps distinguish areas in which the general level of hazard 
is different from that of adjacent areas. However, the level of hazard can 
vary considerably within any hazard zone, either gradually or abruptly. 
Direct volcanic hazards, for example, decrease in magnitude gradually across 
zones away from active vents. For such hazards as lava flows, the frequency 
with which a specific site is affected decreases with increasing distance; for 
other hazards such as tephra and gases, the severity of effects diminishes 
gradually with increasing distance. Such gradational changes in the hazard 
may extend across an entire zone. 
Hazard zones are based chiefly on the assumption that future eruptions will 
be like those in the past that are known from oral and written histories and 
from geologic investigations. Some kinds and scales of eruptive events could 
occur that are not foreseen by these hazards assessments." 
According to Dr. Richard Moore of the U.S.GS, Hawaiian Volcano 
Observatory, the two most critical hazards to geothermal development are lava 
flows and ground subsidence! Dr. Moore believes that earthquakes are also a 
hazard but that structures can be built to withstand them. However, he notes that 
surface pipe systems would be in danger and could be easily ruptured. 
The area in which the proposed geothermal development is to be located is 
shown in Figure 8 According to U.S.G.S. studies, this is an area of high risk due to 
volcanic lava flows. The cross-hatching shows the general area in which the power 
plants will be located, and the line crossing the island shows the preferred route of 
the proposed power transmission lines. 
The US.GS. report cited earlier explains its lava flow hazard zone maps in 
the following way: 
"Hazard zones for lava flows are based chiefly on lava-flow coverage of 
different areas during specific time periods. The zones are also based partly 
on the current structural conditions within the volcanoes, on fault scarps and 
other topographic features that would limit the distribution of lava flows, and 
on the frequency of past eruptive events." 
The greatest degree of hazard exists in Zone 1 and decreases as the zone . 
number increases. Zones 1 and 2 are the zones of greatest concern. I 
I/ Conversation with Dr. Richard Moore on April 8,1987. 
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Figure 8 
HAZARD ZONES FOR LAVA FLOW ON THE ISLAND OF HAWAII 
\\\\ kea of proposed 
geothtrmal development 
Propascdt ' ion route - 
Po 
Source: Volcanism In Hawaii, U.S Geological Survey Professional Paper 1350. 
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Figure 8 indicates that the geothermal plants will be located in or near 
Hazard Zone l, while the transmission lines will traverse Hazard Zone 2 Lava 
flow hazard zones are described as: 
"Zone 1 consists of the summit areas and active parts of the rift zones of 
Kilauea and Mauna Loa; in those areas, 25% or more of the land surface has 
been covered by lava within historical time, during the 19th and 20th 
centuries. These areas contain the sites of most historical eruptions, and a 
large majority of the lava flows that will affect other zones on Kilauea and 
Mauna Loa in the near future probably will originate in Zone 1. 
Zone 2 consists of several areas that are adjacent to and downslope from the 
active rift zones of Kilauea and Mama Loa and therefore are subject to 
burial by lava flows of even small volume erupted in those rift zones. On 
Kilauea south of its east rift zone, as much as 25% of the land surface has 
been covered by lava during historical time, and 1045% has been covered 
since 1950. Lava flows have covered parts of this area as recently as January 
1986, and the history of Kilauea suggests that they will continue until some 
significant change occurs within the volcano. Although very little of the area 
in Zone 2 north of the lower east rift zone of Kilauea has been affected by 
lava since 1950, about lS% of that surface has been covered during historical 
time. On Mauna Loa, long and voluminous lava flows have repeatedly 
entered the areas included in Zone 2, covering about 5% of those areas since 
1950 and about 20% within historical time." 
In addition to lava flows, ground fractures and subsidence will also place 
power plant structures at risk, especially in the Kilauea rift zone area. Figure 9 is 
the hazard zone map for ground fractures and subsidence. The zone of highest 
hazard, Zone 1, includes the summit areas and rift zones of Mauna Loa and 
Kilauea, where fracture and subsidence occur most frequently. On Kilauea, the 
geothermal plants will be located in or near this zone. Zone 2 consists of the south 
flank of Kilauea, where fracturing and subsidence occur somewhat less frequently 
e previously cited U.S.G.S. 
report, the danger is apparent: 
mit and rift zone areas. Again, from 
"Large parts of the flanks of Kilauea and Mauna Loa, for example, sometimes 
subside abruptly. The areas affected may be several tens of kilometers long 
and involve hundreds of square kilometers of land" 
The extent of the danger these hazards present to the project can be 
considerable especially over the long term. The U.S.G.S. report estimates that 
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Figure 9 
HAZARD ZONES FOR GROUND FRACTURES AND 
SUBSIDENCE ON THE ISLAND OF HAWAII 
Source: Volcanism In Hawaii, US. Geological Survey Professional Paper U50. 
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about 5.10% of Kilauea and Mauna Loa could be covered with lava during any 50 
year period If 10 to 20 geothermal plants are located along Kilauea’s rift zone, it 
does not seem unreasonable to assume that one or more may be affected by either 
lava flows or ground subsidence over a 40-year period. Mitigation procedures such 
as lava flow diversions, channels, or barriers may be temporarily effective in some 
cases but can create legal and social problems if the flows are diverted to an area 
which otherwise would have been spared. These structures would have to be quite 
large since lava flows can easily be more than 10 to 20 feet thick and they most 
likely would have to be earthen structures capable of withstanding the tremendous 
heat and pressure of large lava flows. Building on high ground can also be 
effective temporarily, but since lava flows move in unusual ways and change the 
elevation of the land, what was safe in one year may not be safe the next. The 
unusual movements of lava flows are described in the previously cited U.S.G.S. 
report 
‘The paths followed by lava flows are generally downslope, but they may 
vary in detail. Because parts of a flow are continually cooling and becoming 
more viscous, the flow may not move directly into the lowest available 
ground as would a stream of water. Lava flows may move diagonally down 
slopes or even cross low ridges.” 
A proposal to design parts of the plant for mobility and to move them about 
when danger is imminent will require specialized designs, moving equipment and 
assumes enough warning time to shut the plant down, disassemble it, and move the 
components to a safe place. The result is still the loss of a plant site and generating 
capacity. The State report assumes that destroyed plants will be rebuilt 
immediately, but this will depend on the magnitude and length of the eruption and 
assumes a replacement site and wellfield is readily available. If this assumption is 
wrong any components saved from destruction could not be used until new wells 
had been drilled and a safe wellfield and plant site located and developed. 
Whatever shape the mitigation structures take their cost will be 
considerable and will have to be added to the pladwellfield site development 
costs. None of these special design features are considered in the State report or 
are adequately considered in this updated NEA report. 
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The best advice for building in these hazardous areas comes from the 
U.S.G.S. report 
**Protection from the effects of lava flows, other than by such methods of 
diversion or control, is generally not feasible. An individual lava flow will 
have roughly the same effects all the way from its source to its terminus, and 
attempts to protect buildings and other structures from the hot, crushing lava 
generally are not effective." 
**Avoidance through land-use zoning and evacuation is virtually the only way 
to reduce losses from lava flows.** 
The inability to control these hazards has led the U.S.G.S. to recommend that 
facilities that have unusual value or are essential to public health and safety 
should not be built in areas where hazards are high. Power plants are not only 
essential to the public health and safety of a community, but they provide the 
lifeblood required for the maintenance of a healthy, productive society. It seems 
unwise to locate them in areas where their functioning is likely, at best, to be 
disrupted or, at worst, to be completely destroyed. 
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NEA - PROJECT INTEREST RATES 
The cost comparison and present value analysis is done in constant dollars 
using "real" rates of interest. The objective of expressing costs in constant dollars is 
to remove the effects of inflation over time and to allow a comparison of costs 
using a common point as a reference. The term "real" when referring to interest 
rates means the rate is net of (without) inflation. 
The analysis assumes the entity proposing to develop the geothermal 
resource will sell bonds to pay for it. To be consistent with the DAHI report, 24 
year corporate utility bonds are used in the analysis although according to some 
experts 24 years is too long a period for a venture such as this.' 
Four different interest rates are used in the analysis, 1) a low risk bond rate 
for the construction of new oil or solar/oil generating facilities, 2) a high risk bond 
rate for the construction of geothermal generating facilities, 3) a long-term US. 
Treasury bond rate to provide a next best alternative investment and to act as a 
basis for comparing the present net values of the three power generation 
alternatives, and 4) a short-term US. Government security rate for the highly 
liquid plant replacement insurance fund- 
The interest rates used in the analysis can be found in Table 12. The 10 year 
average real rate is used in the analysis Aaa Public Utility bond rate was selected 
for oil and solar/oil alternatives. This rate assumes the risk for the investor is low 
and therefore the cost to the entity issuing the bond is also low. Bond insurance 
increases the rate by 0.0025. 
The Baa bond rate 
risk bond Since t 
geothermal investment. The Baa bond is a 
a1 venture is higher in risk than the other 
es a higher return will have to be guaranteed to investors for their 
ion. A higher return to the investor means a higher cost to the issuing 
entity. Bond insurance is hi risk as well and increases the rate by 0.01. 
11 Alex Sifford, Geothermal Program Manager, Oregon Department of Energy, in his 
review of the DAHI report, June, 1988 
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NEA - PROJECT INSURANCE RATES 
Determining the cost of insuring the geothermal project is difficult since the 
hazards present a unique situation, and while anything is insurable the question is 
at what cost? The two most likely causes of damage to the power plants and well 
fields are lava flows and ground subsidence, while sea-floor earthquakes would be 
the most likely cause of damage to the undersea cable. (See NEA - Geothermal 
Project Hazard Assessment section.) 
To get an idea of what it would cost to insure the power plants and their 
facilities, commercial insurance representatives' were contacted at the Fred S. 
James Company, an insurance bookerage firm in Seattle and Los Angeles. They 
said that perhaps Lloyds of London or AIG would be the type of company that 
could handle a venture as large as the geothermal project but, without much more 
information on the specifics of the project (Le. hazard frequency and intensity, 
plant location, plant construction details, specific in-place mitigation procedures), 
no accurate estimate of project insurance cost could be made or even attempted 
They did indicate however, that the cost of the insurance would be quite high if it 
was available at all. None of the representatives was aware of anyone currently 
offering insurance against the specific types of hazards described (lava flows, 
ground subsidence, etc.). 
There is, however, some parallel between lava flow hazard and floodplain 
hazard. In both cases damage is caused by a moving liquid material, but while 
flood damage need not be total, lava flow damage most assuredly is. 
To explore this option the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) in San Francisco was contacted? While FEMA does not insure against 
lava flows (and is not aware of anyone who does), it does issue flood plain 
insurance up to a value of $200,000 per structure. The rates vary depending on 
11 Phone conversation with Craig Brandt, Fred S. James Company, Seattle, WA January 
- February, 1989. 
- 2l Phone conversation with John Eldridge, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 
San Francisco, California, February, 1989. 
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The only other option open is self-insurance, or absorbing the losses 
internally. If the self-insurance option were taken the project owners would have 
to not only make good on losses to bond holders but would have to pay for the 
immediate replacement of lost generating capacity. It may prove quite difficult to 
sell bonds to finance a new geothermal plant to be built in an area containing 
hazards identical to one that had just been destroyed by lava flows or ground 
subsidence. Bond buyers and insurers would probably be a bit more skeptical of 
the safety of their investment the second time around and would probably require 
an even higher interest rate to cover their risk than the initial offering which was 
a higher risk bond to begin with. 
If it proved difficult to issue bonds at a reasonable rate, money would have 
to be available from some other source in an amount large enough to insure that 
the reserve capacity of the system did not remain below critical levels for a long 
period of time. Output from existing geothermal plants could not simply be 
increased to replace the lost power since the geothermal plants would already be 
operating at their maximum output capacity. The replacement power would have 
to come from somewhere else, and it would have to come quickly because 
maintaining adequate reserve generating capacity is critical to public safety. 
If, for example, total generating capacity were 2000 MW and 3oo/o (a MW) 
were required to be held in reserve, 70% (1400 MW) would be available for the 
system’s annual load The reserve is there to handle peak loads and emergency 
demands that may occur. If some geothermal capacity were lost, reserve capacity 
would drop as well as shown in Table 14. 
If 50 MW is lost the reserve margin drops to 28%; if 100 MW is lost it drops 
to 26%. If we are looking at 25 MW plants and 2 4 plants are lost, the amount of 
capital needed immediately to bring the reserve capacity back up to the 30% level 
would be half a billion dollars. If 6 plants were lost, about three quarters of a 
billion dollars would be needed in a short period of time. 
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'Based on historical records, about 5-10 percent of Kilauea and Mauna Loa 
could be covered during any %year period. Although wide fluctuations can 
be expected in eruptive rates from one decade to another, the overall rates 
likely will remain about the same. It is not possible, however, to predict 
where the next eruptive centers will be, how frequent or copious eruptions 
will be in a specific area, or which specific areas will be covered by lava. 
The volcanic activity along Kilauea's east rift zone in historical time 
illustrates a difficulty in using the short historical record to predict future 
activity in a specific area. Between 1800 and 1950, approximately 2 percent of 
the eastern flanks of the volcano had been covered by lava from the east rift 
zone. In 1950, the probability based on these figures that a site in that region 
would be covered would have been O.Ol3 percent per year. However, between 
1950 and 1975 about 8 percent of Kilauea's east flank was covered by lava, and 
so the coverage in that interval was actually about 032 percent per year. 
Estimates of future coverage may be no more accurate." 
In the description cited above actual lava coverage was 25 times as extensive 
as would have been predicted based on historical records. Given the axiom that 
risk becomes greater as uncertainty becomes greater, that low probability events 
can and do occur, and given the nature of the hazards associated with the area of 
the proposed development, our assumption of a one-half plant replacement fund at 
the worst case scenario and a 40% plant loss does not seem unreasonable- 
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NEA - THE PRICE OF RESIDUAL FUEL OIL 
Determining future world oil prices is difficult because it depends greatly 
on the level of world oil production, future oil exploration and discovery, and 
market responses (demand, substitution etc.) to oil prices over the long term. 
It is generally agreed, and time has shown, that the price of oil is crucial to 
the availability and price of all other energy. A Wall Street Journal article' 
discussing petroleum use states that while there is still concern about OPEC 
domination of oil resources in the future, other forces will act to keep prices in 
check. The article puts it this way: 
Some suggest this could set the stage for a return of the political upheavals 
and price escalation of the 1970s. But others say leading members of OPEC 
such as Saudi Arabia are convinced that relatively low oil prices are in their 
best interests in the long term. They don't want to spur oil exploration in 
other areas-in the high-cost US, for example, where production has rapidly 
declined since the 1986 crash-or lose customers to alternate energy sources 
likely to be launched on the next petroleum price spike. 
But relatively low oil prices will discourage investment in research and 
development of alternate energy sources. That's because many potential 
alternatives, which might be competitive with $40 to $50 a barrel oil, can't 
compete on a cost basis with $18 a barrel oil 
"In the short run, cheap oil keeps down natural gas and coal," says Robert H. 
Horton, a managing director of British Petroleum Co. "In the longer run, 
these and others-including our exotic old friends like solar, shale, windmills 
and the atom- curb excess greed on the part of oil." 
The Gas Research Institute2 agrees on the effects high oil prices have on 
other energy sources: 
11 The Wall Street Journal Industry Focus, Petroteurn Use To Maintain Its Stature, March 1, 
1989. 
21 The Gas Research Institute, '89 Policy Implications Of The GRI Baseline Projection Of 
US. Energy Suppty And Demand To 2010. 
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. 
The highest high price projection is from the U.S. Department of Energy at 
$4934 pex barrel in 2010. The lowest low price if from the Northwest Power 
Planning Council at $23.88 per barrel in 2010. The average of the four sets of 
projections is $30.62 on the low end and $44.63 on the high end in 2010. 
The oil prices used in the analysis are based on these oil price projections 
and on the belief that market forces will limit oil prices to below $50 per barrel. 
An oil price of $25 per barrel is used as a starting point in the 5th year (1994) and is 
increased at an annual real rate of 4.0% until a price of $45.00 is reached in the 2lst 
year (2010). The $45.00 price is then kept constant throughout the remainder of the 
analysis period The oil price is in 1990 dollars. 
. 
NEA - PROJECT COST COMPARISON 
In this analysis the cost of generating 500 net MW of electricity from the 
three different sources described earlier is compared 
Generation sources 
Alternative #1 
20 - 25 net MW geothermal power plants 
Alternative #2 
5 - 100 net MW oil-fired power plants 
Alternative #3 
5 - 100 net MW solar/oil-fired power plants 
Alternatives 2 and 3 are also compared to ten 50 net MW geothermal power plants. 
The following four scenarios detail the costs of the three generating options 
used in the analysis. Scenario 1 uses 25 MW power plants at the low plant cost; 
Scenario 2 uses 25 MW power plants at the high plant cost; Scenario 3 uses 50 MW 
power plants at the low plant costs, and Scenario 4 uses 50 MW power plants at the 
high plant costs. 
Capital costs used are described in earlier project cost sections. Interest 
rates, insurance, and oil prices are also described in earlier sections. Other costs 
used in the analysis are explained below. The project spans a 40 year time period 
All dollar amounts are in 1990 dollars. 
The major line items in the scenarios are explained as follows: 
describes the scenario being compared. 
is the year of the project. 
Scenario - 
Year - 
GEOTHERMAL POWER GENERATION 
Geothermal 
Development 
Timetable (MW) 
Is the phasing in of geothermal plants. For 25 M W  plants one 
is brought on line every 12 months. For 50 MW plants one is 
brought on line every 24 months. 500 MW is on line by the end 
of the 21st year. 
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PESIDUAL mTEL OIL POWER GENERATION cont’d 
Electricity Produced Is the amount of electricity produced in loo0 MWh assuming 
the plants operate at 80% capacity (8070 of the time) 
The amount of oil in million barrels it takes to produce the 
electricity in the line just above. We used a fuel conversion 
efficiency factor of 35%. 
Oil Consumed 
Capital The annual capital costs of the power plants using Aaa bond rates. 
O&M The annual O&M costs of the power plants. (Northwest Power Planning 
Council estimate.) 
Fuel The annual fuel costs of the power plants (oil consumed times oil 
price). 
Administrative Based on similar costs per kWh found in Hawaiian Electric 
Expenses Industries, Inc. Annual Report. 
cost Total annual project cost. 
With Profit Total annual project cost with 8% profit. Profit is calculated as a 
. percent of annual costs based on Hawaiian Electric Industries, Inc. 
Annual Report. 
The second set of costs is in cents per kilowatt hour. 
SOLAR/RESIDUAL FUEL OIL POWER GENERATION 
Solar Facility 
Development 
Timetable (MW) 
Is the phasing in of oil fired power plants. One 100 MW plants 
is brought on line every 5 years. 500 MW is on line by the end 
of the 2lst year. 
Electricity Produced Is the amount of electricity produced in lo00 MWh assuming 
the plants operate at 80% capacity (80% of the time) 
Is the amount of electricity produced in loo0 MWh by the solar 
generation portion of the facility. 
Is the price paid for a barrel of residual fuel oil. See section 
NEA - The Price of Residual Fuel Oil 
Is the amount of electricity produced in lo00 MWh by the oil 
generation portion of the facility. 
The amount of oil in million barrels it takes to produce the 
electricity in the line just above. We used a fuel conversion 
efficiency factor of 35%. 
The annual capital costs of the power plants using Aaa bond rates. 
Solar Produced 
Electricity 
Oil Price 
Oil Produced 
Electricity 
Oil Consumed 
Capital 
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SCENARIO 1 
25 MW ower plants using 
20% contingency 
low plant P wellfield costs and a 
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SCENARIO 2 
25 MW power plants using 
high plant/wellfield costs and a 
20% contingency 
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SCENARIO 3 
50 MW ower plants using 
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Table 16 
25 NET M W  SUMMARY TABLE 
LOW G E O T H E W  COSTS 
20% CONTINGENCY 
Geothermal SoIar/Oil Oil 
(l,W MWh Produced) 
Total Oil Consumed (M bbl) 
B$ Development Cost 
B$ 40 Yr. Cumulative Cost 
B$ NPV 
Cost Ratio (oil = LO) 
Cost Ratio (solar/oil = LO) 
Levelized CentskWh 
1067% 
0 
3.6 
121 
4.9 
185 
u6 
ll.87 
~~ 
98112 
WO solar 
7Wo oil 
106 
21 
10.6 
3.6 
u 7  
LOO 
10.81 
152 
05 
86 
27 
LOO 
0.73 
873 
Table 17 
25 NET MW SUMMARY TABLE 
HIGH GEOTHERMAL COSTS 
20% CONTINGENCY 
Geothermal Solar/Oil Oii 
(l,W MWh Produced) 
Total Oil Consumed (M bbl) 
B$ Development Cost 
B$40 Yr. Cumulative Cost 
B$ NPV 
Cost Ratio (oil = LO) 
Cost Ratio (solar/oil = LO) 
Levelized CentskWh 
10l,7% 
0 
43 
15.0 
6.0 
225 
165 
14.71 
98Ja 
WO solar 
7Wo oil 
106 
21 
10.6 
3.6 
u 7  
LOO 
10.81 
152 
05 
86 
27 
LOO 
0.73 
873 
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Table 23 
50 NET MW SUMMARY TABLE 
LOW GEOTHERMAL COSTS 
30% CONTINGENCY 
Geothermal Solar/Oil oil 
(l,OOO MWh Produced) 
Total Oil Consumed (M bbl) 0 106 152 
B$ Development Cost 
B$40 Yr. Cumulative Cost 
3.6 
lL4 
21 05 
10.6 86 
B$ NPV 4.7 3.6 27 
Cost Ratio (solar/oil = LO) l.29 LOO 0.73 
Cost Ratio (oil = LO) L76 l.37 LOO 
Levelized CentskWh 1L49 l o a  a73 
Table 24 
50 NET MW SUMMARY TABLE 
HIGH GEOTHERMAL COSTS 
30% CONTINGENCY 
m 
WO solar 
7wo oil 
($000 MWh Produced) w 
Total Oil Consumed (M bbl) 0 106 152 
B$ Development Cost 43  21 05 
B$40 Yr. Cumulative Cost 14.1 10.6 86 
B$ NPV 5.7 3.6 27 
Cost Ratio (solar/oil = LO) 155 LOO 0.73 
Cost Ratio (oil = LO) 213 137 LOO 
Levelized CentskWh 1424 l o a  873 
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NEA - CONSERVATION AND SOLAR ENERGY 
Conservation can be a key resource for meeting Hawaii's future electrical 
energy needs. Each mega of electricity conserved is one less megawatt that 
needs to be generated. Utilities all across the country are beginning to see 
conservation as a resource much less costly than the addition of new generating 
facilities. An article on energy appearing in The Nation's Business, February 1990 
states: 
Experts say that universal adoption of standard conservation measures, such 
as insulation, recycling, and other practices, could cut US. energy 
consumption by as much as 20 percent. Even more energy could be saved, 
they add through broader application in business and industry of new 
technologies such as high-eff iciency lighting, automatic controls, heat pumps, 
adjustable-speed drives, and thermal storage. 
A major boost for servation is coming from utilities, which see programs 
to reduce demand as attractive alternatives to building more plants or buying 
electricity from independent producers. Financial incentives are available in 
many areas to business and individual users who agree to install energy- 
saving equipment or to cut back voluntarily on energy consumption. 
Conservation no longer means "freezing in the da rk  or "lowering your 
standard of living" as critics like to contend. It means being smart. I t  means being 
efficient, and that means it makes good business sense. The Northwest Power 
Planning Council, the organization the Pacific Northwest responsible for energy 
planning defines conservation in th 
Conservation refers to the more efficient use of electricity-not curtailment- 
that results in the reduction of consumption. This means that less electricity 
is used to support the same level of amenity or production that existed before 
the conservation measure was implemented. Conservation resources are 
measures that enable residential and commercial buildings, appliances, and 
industrial and irrigation processes to use energy efficiently. 
11 1989 Supplement T o  The 1986 Northwest Conservation and Electric Power Plan, Volume 1, 
Northwest Power Planning Council, 1989. 
93 
Conservation is also a uniquely flexible resource. Some conservation 
programs automatically match growth in electrical demand Such is the case 
when new buildings are mandated by code to be energyefficient. Each new 
building adds load to the electrical system, but can also save energy if it is 
better insulated than current practice. Thus, if the economy grows rapidly, 
the conservation resource expands quickly; but if the economy slows, the 
conservation resource automatically tracks the more slowly growing loads. 
Conservation can also be developed more quickly than generating resources 
when more electricity is required 
In other regions besides the Pacific Northwest conservation is being taken 
quite seriously by states and utilities. In New England the New England Electric 
System in partnership with the Conservation Law Foundation has begun a $65 
million dollar per year energy conservation program! 
In California the California Energy Commission is writing and revising 
California’s building and appliance standards. The Commission a€so forecasts 
energy supply and demand, approves or denies the need for new power plants, and 
reports to the Governor and Legislature on statewide energy use? 
The State of Hawaii faces the same problem as many of these other regions, 
whether to build more generating capacity or to become more efficient. The 500 
MW geothermal project will cost the state and its ratepayers an immense amount 
of money. Conservation and increased efficiency will cost much less and involve 
much less risk. Table 26 shows the cost per kWh of some simple conservation 
measures and the effect they can have on reducing energy demand. 
The 866 million kilowatt hours saved per year converts to about 123.6 annual 
megawatts of generating capacity (866 million i 8,760 i OS + 1,OOO). This is about 
25% of the proposed 500 MW geothermal project. It consists of only five simple 
efficiency measures and costs an average of 3.0 cent per kWh. 
- 1/ Energy Efficiency and Least Cost Planning: The Best Way To Save Money and Reduce 
Energy Use I n  Hawaii, Robert J. Mowris, January 11,1990. (See Appendix D in this 
report.) 
- 21 ibid 
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Table 26 
CONSERVATION MEASURE COS"/KWH' 
Added AM-1 cost of Estimated Statewide 
Retail nectricity co l lscd  Number SPvingS 
Efficiency Measure cost Life M t Y  Units Million 
Thousands Million kWhlyr s kwv YCan WkWh 
R-10 Water-Heater 
Blanket 25 6.50 
Water-Saving 
Showerhead 20 3 0  
10 06 2u 140 
10 as 21s 67 
Compact Fluorescent 
12 88 68 2.6 yo0 132 b P  
Heat-Pump 
Water Heater 5280 
1989 Best 
Mass- Produced 
Refrigerator 
Average Cost of 
rill Measures 
60 12s ls 4.6 292 365 
3.0 
10 4.0 2u 490 
Total Savings 866 
y "Energy Efficiency and Least Cost Planning: The Best Way To Save Money and Reduce Energy Use In Hawaii" 
Robert J. M o a  January 1% W. (See Appendix D in this report) 
Table 27 compares the cost of these five conservation measures with the cost 
of adding 500 MW of geothermal, solar/oil, and oil fired generating capacity. 
Table 27 
COST COMPARISON OF CONSERVATION AND 
500 MW ADDED GENERATING CAPACITY 
Geothermal 20% Contingency 10.97 - 14.71 
Geothermal 30% Contingency ll.49 - fi.43 
Solar/Oil l0sl 
873 
3.0 
The cost of conservation is by far the least expensive of the five options. 
Geothermal is the most expensive being 3.6 to 51 times as costly as conservation, 
while solar/oil is 3.6 times as costly, and oil 29 times the cost of conservation. 
The conservation measures mentioned here are only a few of those 
available. Passive cooling building design, efficient air conditioning systems, waste 
heat recycling and co-generation can all contribute to lowering energy demand and 
cost. Conservation in concert with an aggressive solar energy program can have a 
considerable impact on energy use. In Florida, like Hawaii, cooling is a major user 
of electricity. Passive solar design in new homes can, according to the Florida Solar 
Energy Center,’ can cut costs in half: 
In Florida, energy consumption in new homes can be reduced by 50% through 
passive cooling designs that add $2,000 to construction costs to typical homes, 
according to the Florida Solar Energy Center. Because an average home in 
Florida consumes 12,000 kWh/year, a $2,,ooO investment can save at least 6,000 
kWh/year over an assumed =year life of the home. The cost of the 
conserved energy is about Ll cents/kWh (in constant dollars) compared with 
the average cost of electricity in Florida of 8 cents/kWh. The total 
investment can be recouped by savings on energy bills in less than 5 years. 
The designs that accomplish these savings include siting a new house facing 
north (for cooling), painting the house a light color, using light colored 
shingles or roofing, and installing attic radiant barriers, wall insulation, 
double pane windows with a reflective coating, and awnings. 
And for existing homes 
Increments of savings can also be achieved at low cost. A recent estimate by 
Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory shows that planting trees in urban areas is a 
cheap way to save air conditioning power. By planting 3 trees around a 
house to shade an air conditioner, 750 to 2,000 kWh/year of electricity could 
be saved at a cost of 02 to 1 cent/kWh (assuming $15 to $75 per tree plus 
watering costs). 
The cost of conserved energy from low-E window glazing is currently 
$4/MBtu, and, as the market matures, the cost is estimated to drop to WMBtu 
(When these windows saturate the market early in the next century they will 
save energy equivalent to one-sixth of the output of the Alaska pipeline, or 
over 300,000 barrels of oil per day.) 
- 1/ Power Surge, The Status and Near-Term Potential of Renewable Energy Technologies, by 
Nancy Rader, for the Public Citizen Critical Mass Energy Project, May 1989. 
% 
And for both new and existing homes 
The cost of energy saved over the 2CLyear life of an active solar domestic hot 
water system is about 4 to 5 cents/kWh. These systems can save from 40-70% 
of annual water heating costs. 
The performance of solar energy systems is continually improving along 
with their appearance, reliability and cost. And they are becoming more and more 
competitive in the energy market place as Richard Balzhiser of the Electric Power 
Research Institute states in the previously mentioned article from Nations Business, 
February 1990: 
Solar energy could be an exception. Balzhiser says: "I think solar and 
particularly photovoltaic technology [in which sunlight is converted to 
electricity] is one [area] where we'll see continual progress scientifically." 
Much of that progress is already here and readily available. 
The conservation option and the solar option are two extremely important 
ways by which Hawaii can reduce its future energy demand. If these areas are 
explored and promoted with the same zeal as the geothermal project they hold the 
promise of even greater benefits with much less cost, risk, and public agitation. 
Hawaii should consider establishing a separate state government agency similar to 
the Northwest Power Planning Council and the California Energy Commission to 
examine all energy issues, needs and options and to actively develop and promote 
the most effective and least cost of them. The newly formed Hawaii Energy 
Coalition, a citizens group of planners and environmentalists, seems already 
headed in that direction. 
97 
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NEA - CONCLUSIONS 
Based on this analysis the 500 MW geothermal project is the more costly and 
more risky of the available options. Its cumulative cost over 40 years in 1990 
dollars is between $108 and $15.7 billion while solar/oil is $l0.6 billion and 
conventional oil is $8.6 billion. In terms of net present values (the cumulative costs 
discounted back at a constant rate over 40 years to indicate how much you would 
have to invest today to achieve the same end in 40 years) the geothermal project is 
between $45 and $63 billion while solar/oil is $3.6 and oil is $27 billion. You would 
have to invest $0.9 to $2.7 billion more today in geothermal than solar/oil, and $18 to 
$3.6 billion more than oil to achieve the same benefit over the 40 year analysis 
period. Table 28 shows the annual cents per kWh increase over the estimated 
average current rate ratepayers would have to pay to cover the costs of the various 
generation options if they were incorporated into the overall generating system. 
Table 28 
INCREASE OVER CURRENT RATES FOR 
VARIOUS GENERATION OPTIONS 
(centskWh) 
(Estimated 1990 Average Current Rate-7.43ctkWh) 
Average Rate 
Levelized Cost Increase Over 
Geothermal WO Contingency ll.49 - i5.43 
Geothermal 20% Contingency 10.97 - 14.71 m-2.24 
7.2% - 30.2%) 
Solar/Oil l.23 
(16.6%) 
Oil a73 0.73 
(9A%) 
99 
. 
Ratepayers could annually pay more than three times as much for 
geothermal generated power as for oil generated power, and twice as much as for 
solarloil generated power over their current rates. 
In spite of the fact that geothermal costs are high NEA considers this 
analysis to be conservative. Recent revelations at The Geysers in California, the 
largest geothermal power production field in the world, indicate that the project is 
running out of steam and that billions of dollars may be lost as a result of this 
unexpected turn of events. This from the Oakland Tribune, November, 1989! 
The world's largest geothermal-power producing field, The Geysers near 
Clear Lake, is running out of steam. 
To the astonishment of most geological experts, the steam that has powered 
$2 billion worth of nearly new power plants is declining sharply, and 
electrical output is dropping. 
Over the past two years, steam pressure has dropped 20 percent; some experts 
now predict it will be down by half by the end of the century. 
This  caught all of the geological experts by surprise," Charles Imbrecht, 
Chairman of the California Energy Commission, said last week. 
"We're taking it very, very seriously. There is several billion dollars' worth of 
investment in The Geysers," Imbrecht said. 
The Geysers is the most studied geothermal reservoir in the world and the 
most developed, yet the predictions and theories concerning its energy capacity and 
potential are falling far short of expectations as the Oakland Tribune article goes 
on to state: 
Since oil and gas companies operate The Geysers steam wells, their officials 
are especially worried. Tom Sparks, a geothermal expert with Unocal Corp, 
the largest Geysers developer, said, "No one foresaw this happening. 
"We had thought there was a steady boiling mechanism 15 miles down, but 
that theory isn't working," Sparks said." 
- 1/ Geysers Failing, Billions of Dollars May Be Lost, By Steven H. Heimoff, The Tribune, 
Oakland, California, November 5,1989. 
100 
c 
The owners and investors at The Geysers are now rethinking their position 
in light of recent events: 
Eastbay utility customers as well as investors have a stake in The Geysers. 
Geothermal power is cheap because is uses free steam and a simple 
generating system, if it peters out electricity from more expensive sources 
will be used and The Geysers idle power plants will a have to be paid off. 
Pacific Gas and Electric Co, which dominates the region with 19 power 
plants, has cancelled plans to build two more plants. 
If this could happen at The Geysers, an area which has been studied so 
thoroughly, it could easily happen in Hawaii where the resource has been studied 
little by comparison. 
Geothermal experts in California now feel that the original resource was 
overestimated and that too much steam is being withdrawn too quickly. Again, 
from the Oakland Tribune article: 
"Geothermal power is a depletable resource. It's been known that the field 
would decline." said Unocal spokesman Harry Bain. 
"Many of the plants were built in the middle 1980s" energy commission 
information officer Claudia Barker said. "They should have a 20- to =year 
lifespan." Instead, she noted, they may last half that long." 
Experts can only guess at the reasons for the shortfall, but most feel that too 
many plants are tapping a resource that is more limited than originally 
estimated 
The Northern California Power Association, a consortium of municipal 
utility companies, testified before the State Energy Commission on Sept. 21 
that the problem "is directly re1 
PG&E public relations spokes 
many straws in the soup. 
the mass withdrawal of steam." 
saying, "There are too 
The proposed a1 Project will require 300 production wells 
(straws) at 4 MW per well and 400 production wells at 3 MW per well over the 
expected life of the project at 100% replacement If, as is the case at The Geysers, 
the resource rapidly becomes depleted and the wells fail sooner than expected 
more wells will have to be sunk to try to replace the lost energy. At  200% 
\ 
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replacement the number of production wells could be between 450 and 600 over the 
expected life of the project. This large number of wells may easily overtap the 
reservoir. 
For sake of continuity our analysis assumes that wellfield production will be 
adequate to maintain 500 net MW of output throughout the analysis period. In 
reality, however, this may not be the case and costs will rise accordingly. (See 
Appendix E for project costs at 200% well replacement.) 
The extent and potential of the geothermal reservoir on Hawaii is unknown. 
For the most part it is being assumed that the 500 MW (600 MW gross) of energy is 
there and will be available for the long term. But according to testimony given in 
19S2 by Robert Decker, Scientist-incharge of the U.S. Geological Surveys’ 
Hawaiian Volcano Observatory’ 
Any electrical power ,extraction from the Kahaule’a section of the east rift of 
Kilauea in excess of about 5 MW will not be replenished by new thermal 
power from the volcano and will probably deplete the geothermal resource. 
The simple fact is the experts do not know how large the geothermal 
resource in Hawaii is or much energy can be extracted or at  what rate before 
depletion occurs. Until this is known, rushing headlong into an incredibly costly 
500 MW development project makes little economic sense, especially when other 
alternatives like conservation, solar, and improving existing efficiencies are 
available at far less cost. The geothermal project is being touted as a means of 
putting an end to Hawaii’s energy problems when in reality it could be just the 
beginning of them. 
If the state of Hawaii is really concerned about its long-term energy needs it 
should begin by looking at what an aggressive energy conservation and energy 
efficiency program can do about reducing energy demand, and then examine its 
least cost generation options. A single massive energy project is not the answer for 
the long run, because in the long-run survival does not necessarily go to the biggest 
or strongest, most often but to the smartest, most adaptable and most efficient 
users of resources. 
- 11 Energy Efficiency and Leas Cost Planning: The Best Way T o  Save Money and Reduce 
Energy Use I n  Hawaii, Robert J. Mowris, January 11,1990, (see Appendix D). 
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APPENDIX A 
WELL COSTS 
.l 
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APPENDIX B 
PLANT COSTS 
1ESOURCE TENPERAIURE: 
? L A I T  C A P A C I T I :  
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Sf 
I 
1 
1 
? 
? 
P 
? 
13 conts/kUh 
11 milos 
2.51 rillion 1991 $ 
1.15 rillion 1990 $ 
a 
4 
I2 
8 
KESOURCE IENPERATURE: 
? L A H I  C A P A C l I Y :  
T E C I N O t O 6 Y  ( S f , D f , B ) :  
T t l R A I N  LABOR FACTOR (Y*l,N*0): 
T E l R l l N  SlTt PREP (Y*l,N=#): 
C O N S I l U C I I O R  CARP ( Y 4 J 4 ) :  
P l A X T  I I N: LOU,?ROB.,or IIISH 
?ROOUCTIOH E~UI?iINI: l,P,W 
INlfCTION EOUIPNENT: 1,P.H 
YELL 0 I I: L,?,t 
E L E C T K I C I T Y  COST: 
TRANSNISSION L I R E  O I S I l N C E :  
l tRA1N1N6 ASSESSNENI UORK: 
PERllITf/LJCtNSES: 
I ?ROOUCIION UELLS: 
1 IlJtClIOll NILIS: 
I lEPLICElEN1 UELLS: 
I UNSUCCESSFUL UELLS: 
UELLFIELO C A P 1 1 1 1  COSIS 
PROOUCTION ~ ~ U l P R t N T  
INIECTIOI EQUIPHEN1 
TERR11N LABOR A D I U S T N E I T  
T E l l A I N  SITE P R E ? . l O l U s I n E I I T  
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s u I 1 0  I 1 L (UtllFlELO) 
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UtLLfIElD C W / K U  
UILL I UELLFIELO 0 I N COSTS 
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351 OH c 
21.5 NU (3 NU/UEll) 
SF 
I 
1 
1 
II 
I 
n 
n 
13 contr/kUh 
11 rilot 
3.18 rilllon 1991 $ 
1 . 0  rillion 1991 $ 
1I 
5 
15 
11 
UElLFlfLD CAP1111 COSTS 
I R O O U C T I O N  EQUIPRENT 
I N J E C T I O N  fQUI?NENT 
T E l l l I I N  L A W  l D I U S T N t i 1  
T E l R l l N  S I T E  ?RE?.1OlUSlNtNI 
CONSIRUCTIOH CAlP 
s I I T I 1 A L (UELLf1EL0) 
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Y E L L F I E L O  COST/NU 
UfLLFltLD cosr/ru 
YELL I UELLFIELO o 6 n COSTS 
Ut11 I U E L L F I E L D  0 I I COSIS 
4.91 
4.11 
I.11 
1.19 
1.1s 
11.93 rillion 1984 $ 
11.91 riiiioo 1 w  t
1.43 rillion 1991 $ 
1.14 rillion 1914 $ 
1.11 rillion 1991 $ 
433 1991 $ 
6.13 
5.12 
1.11 
I.24 
1.16 
13.15 rill1011 1914 $ 
14.32 rillion 19YI $ 
1.52 rilllon 1991 $ 
1.11 rillion 1914 $ 
1.19 rillion 1991 $ 
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POUIR ? L I N T  C A P I T l L  COSlS 
POUEK ?LAN1 
T l l R A l H  L A I I O I  10JUSINEiT 
T E l R A I N  S I T E  ?RIP. AOlUSTRfNT 
COlSIRUCTION CLIP  
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12s AIIAIEREIIT 
PLANT 0 I II COSTS 
PLAN1 0 I N COSTS 
21.34 
6.46 
1.10 
1.62 
2.85 
34.21 rillion 1914 $ 
31.32 ailllon 1991 $ 
1.36 million 1991 $ 
1351 1991 $ 
1.12 rillion I914 $ 
1.91 rillion 1991 $ 
24.34 
9.11 
1.11 
1.68 
2.85 
31.51 rillion 1984 $ 
41.91 rilllon 1991 $ 
1.49 rilllon 1998 $ 
i48a 1991 t 
3.32 rillion 1914 $ 
3.62 rillion I991 $ 
P L A N T / U E L L F I t L O  C A P I T A 1  C O S T S  
PLANI/UELLfltLD FOST/RU 
? L A I T / U E L L f I E l D  COSr/KU 
UELL O R I L L I N 6  COSTS 
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Toll1 C I P l T A l  COSTS 
49.21 rillion 1996 $ 
1.19 rillion 1991 t 
1191 I991 $ 
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PL1NT/UELlfIELD cosT/ lu  
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TOTAL CAPITAL CDSTS 
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2.11 rillion 1991 $ 
2118 1991 $ 
45.18 rillion 1998 $ 
3.61 rlllion 1991 $ 
113.83 rillion 1991 $ ' 
TOTAL 0 I I COSTS 2.19 rillion 1991 $ 10111 0 I N COSTS 4.81 rllllon 1991 $ 
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2829.31 rillion 1998 $ 
3639.31 rillion 1991 $ 
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* 
3 R A U I I I  C E O T Y E l t A l  ? R O J E C T  COST E S T I N A T E  S I f E T  
25 NET I f C l U l l l  ? L A I T  
LOU ESTIlITE--l99l IOLLIRS 
KfSOURCt I E K P E l A l l K E :  
? L A I T  C A P M I T T :  
TtCRROLOtT (Sf,Of,t): 
T E t R A I N  L18OR FACTO1 (T=L , I - l ) :  
TElK1111 S I T E  I R E ?  (T=t,#*#): 
COIISTRUCIIOI C l K P  ( V - l , R 4 ) i  
PLAIT I I a: t o w o s . , t r  iicn 
?KOOOClIOl E g U l P R E N T :  L,?,l 
I I J E C T I O I  I V J I ? I E I T :  L ? , R  
YELL 0 c I: L,?,R 
E L t C T K I C I T V  C I S T :  
TR~NSllSSIOI LINE I I S l A l t E :  
t E R l I N I I 6  ASSESSNERl  UOKC: 
? E K N l T S / l l C f  NXS: 
I ?KODUCTION UEllS: 
I I I I J I C T I I N  YELLS: 
I K E ? l l C E R E I T  UELLS: - I U N f U C C E S S F U l  YELLS:  
UEtlFltlO CIPIIAL COSTS 
?RODUC1ION EQUIPllfll 
I I J E C T I O I  E ( U I ? N E I T  
I E l K l I K  118011 1 U J U S T N E I l  
T t t K l l N  S I T t  ?K€?.ADJUSlREIIT 
C O K S T ~ U C T S O I  C A W  
S I 1 1  8 T A L (ULlLFlfLD) 
5 I 1 1  0 T A 1 ( Y E L L F I E L I )  
YELLFI fLO COST/IU 
YLLLFIEL I  c l s T / r Y  
YELL I Y E L l l I E l I  I 8 l COSTS 
U€LL t UELlfIELO 8 I a COSTS 
? O U E t  ? L I N T  CAPITAL C O S l S  
I O U E K  ? L l X T  
IZS A811ENtlT 
T E l K l I K  11808 lDJ l lSTNEIT  
ltKR1Il S I T E  ? R E ? .  10JUSlKlRT 
coasituciion CARP 
s II 1 T I I A L (?OUEII ?trIT) 
S U 1 1 t I 1 L (?WK ?L111) 
?OUfl ? L A I T  COST/lU 
?OUEK fL1IIl COST/tU 
?1M1 I I I C@STS 
? L A I T  0 I I COSTS 
l/Ufll!I~LP CIPITAL COSTS 
? L A I T / U E L L F I E L 1  tOST/liU 
? L I I I T / U E L L f I E L I  COST/tY 
YELL OPILLlR6 C I S T S  
1 K I t S I I f S l O I I  LIKE C I S T S  
TrJfIl CIP ITAL COSTS 
lOl1t 1 t I COSTS 
PLLIIT/UELL l l S E  COST: 
unit COSTS: 
TOTAL ?LAIl/YELL I A S E  COSI: 
UITW 311 C01111611tT: 
KUl8EK I f  ?OULK ? l l K l S  I f E O E 1 :  
TOTAL COST FOR ?OUfK ?LAKTS: 
SUBNIRlKE C A N E  COSTS: 
OVIKIIEAO T R l l l S I I S S I O R  C W S :  
TOTAL ?ROJECT CAPITAL COST: 
Y I l l  K E ? L A C E I t I T  YELLS:  
151 IEC t
21.5 IIU ( 4  NU/UELL)  
Sf 
I 
1 
I 
? 
? 
? 
? 
13 ceatr/kUb 
11 1110s 
2.51 rlllitn 1991 $ 
1.15 rillitn 1991 $ 
I 
4 
12 
1 
4.91 
4.10 
1.11 
1.19 
1.16 
11.93 rillitn 1914 $ 
11.91 rlllitn 1998 
1.43 rilllon 1991 $ 
1.14 rilllon 1984 $ 
1.11 rillitn 1991 8 
133 1991 $ 
14.14 
1.46 
1.11 
1.62 
2.15 
34.21 rilllta 1984 $ 
31.32 rillltn 1991 $ 
1.36 rillitn 1991 $ 
1351 1991 $ 
1.12 rlllltn 1Y14 $ 
1.9: rllllra 199: $ 
49.23 rlllion 1991 $ 
. l Y  rllllon 1991 $ 
101 1991 
13.15 rilllon 1991 I 
1.61 rllllon 1¶¶1 $ 
11.51 rillion 1901 $ 
2.l) rillion 1991 $ 
16.58 
1.25 tillion 1991 $ 
19.13 rilllen 1991 $ 
1lS.11 
21.11 
2335.41 rillitn 1931 $ 
314.56 rillion 1991 t 
ZY8.94 lillitn 1991 $ 
3118.96 rillitn 19N $ 
18116.46 tillion 1991 $ 
55.11 rlllita 1991 $ 
lIIll ESTINA~E-199 l  OOLLARS 
t E S O U K C ~  t € & K l l U K E :  
l l A R T  CLPlCITT: 
lfCIIOL#CT (Sf.lf.1): 
T I K R A I I  L180K F l C l O R  [ V 4 , R * l ) :  
T l l R A I l l  SIlf ?RE? ( T = I , b I ) :  
COXSTRUCTIbI C M P  (V=l .R* l ) :  
?LIIIT t c I: L I Y , P ~ O L . ~ ~  n I u  
?ROOUtlI8R tOUI?lEKT: L,?,U 
1IJECTIOR t Q D l ? l l R l :  L.?,II 
Ut11 0 I R: l,?,I 
ElfCTKICIl? 1151: 
1 R A R S R I S S I O R  L I N E  0 1 S T M C f  : 
K ~ t A I R 1 I 5  1 S f E S S N l R T  U O t K :  
? E t N l T S / L I C f R S E S :  
I P K O O U C T I 1 I  UELLS: 
I I R J E C l I O l  YfL lS:  
I t E P l 1 C E N W  YELLS: 
I lllSUCCESSFUL YELLS; 
U E L L F I E l l  C A P I T A L  C I S T S  
?ROOUCTIOX E V I I ? I I E I T  
1 R J E C l I O N  t l U I ? I I E I T  
T E K P l I K  L11OP A O J U S T K E I T  
T E l K l I R  Sllt ?KE?.1DJUSTNERl 
COIST~!JCTIOX C A I P  
S 0 1 T 0 1 A L ( U E l L F l E L l )  
f l I 1 1 1 1 L (UELLFlfLl) 
YLLLf IELI  tOST/RU 
YILtfIIL1 c o s ~ / r Y  
YELL I uiiifitu e c I c o m  
UELL I Y E L L F I E L I  I I II COSTS 
TOT11 ?ROJfCT C I P I T L L  C W :  
UIll l E ? L I C E I E N T  UEllS: 
1 R I U I L  P R O J E C T  0 C I COST: 
351 ) t i  c 
11.5 RU ( 3  R U / U E L l )  
Sf 
I 
1 
1 
w 
II 
I 
n 
I3 cents/kYh 
11 riles 
3.11 rlllitn 1991 $ 
1.0 rillitn 1991 $ 
I1 
5 
15 
11 
1.13 
5.12 
1.11 
8.24 
1.16 
13.15 rillitn 1914 $ 
1 4 . ~ 1  riiiitn 1991 
1.52 rlllita 1))) $ 
521 1991 $ 
1.11 1i111to 1Yt4 I 
1.19 rlllltn 1991 1 
24.34 
9.11 
8.11 
1.68 
2.15 
31.51 rlllltn 1914 $ 
41.91 rllllta 1YYI $ 
1.49 tillltn 1991 $ 
14: 1991 $ 
3.32 ~ I ~ I I O I I  1914 I 
3.62 tilllri 19)) $ 
55.23 rlllitn 1991 $ 
2.11 rlllltn 1991 $ 
2111 1931 $ 
45.11 rillltn 1991 8 
1.11 iilllta 1991 I 
183.13 rillitn 1991 I 
4.81 rfllita I991 $ 
113.13 
4.11 rillitn 1991 $ 
111.13 rlllian 1991 $ 
141.1: 
21.11 
2813.15 illlien 1991 $ 
314.56 #lllita 1991 $ 
298.94 rillirn 1991 $ 
3411.15 rlllion 1Y9l I 
1641.15 rillim 1991 t 
96.29 rillltn 1991 $ 
IIAUAII S E O T Y t l I l l  ? R O J E C T  C O S 1  ESlIIAlE SHEET 
51 R E T  NfCAUAll ?L1N1 
LOU ESl IN1TE-- l99 l  D O L L A R S  
K E S O U R C E  TtNPERlTURl:  
? L A I T  C I P A C I l Y :  
IfCHNOlOtY (SF,Of, l ) :  
T E R R A I N  L18OR f 1 C I O R  ( Y * I J * l ) :  
T E R R A I R  S H E  P I E ?  ( Y 4 , R - I ) :  
C O l l S I R U C l I O I  C A W  ( Y = l , l l = l ) :  
PLMI I I a: LOU,PKO8.,or #ISH 
? R O O U C I I O N  E P U I P I I E R T :  1.P.H 
I N J E C T I O R  E Q U I ? ? E U :  L , P , H  
YELL o I n: L,P,N 
E L E C T I ) I C I T Y  C O S T :  
T K A N S I I S S I O W  L I N E  OISIANCE: 
IEIAINIIC ISSESSNENI UORK: 
?E l N I T f / L I C E N S E S :  
I PioouciIoa UELLS: 
I I I J E C T I O N  UELLS: 
I K E P l A C t N E N l  YELLS: 
I U I I S U C C E S S f U L  UELLS: 
POUEK ?LAIT C h P I l l t  C O S T S  
POUEI ? L A I T  
l l2S AB1TtNElT 
T E I R A I R  L M O R  A D J U S T H E I T  
C O I S T I I C I I O R  CAN? 
S 0 8 1 0 I 1 L (POUEI PLANT) 
S U I T O  1 1 L (POUEK P L A I T )  
P O U E K  PLANT C O S I / K U  
IEKRLII SIIE wr. ~ O J U S I I E U T  
POUEI ? L L N I  cosr/uu 
PL1Nl  0 I I C O S T S  
? L A N 1  I I I C O S T S  
?1AIT/UEllFIELD ClPllll C O S T S  
?LANl/UELLfIfLO C O S T / I U  
?LANT/UELLfItLO C O S T / K U  
UELL I R I L L I W S  C O S l S  
T I A N S N I S S I O N  L I I E  C O S T S  
TOTAL C A P I T A 1  C O S T S  
TOTAL P R O J E C T  C A P I T A L  C O S T :  
UIlH K I P L A C E N I W T  YELLS: 
358 DE6 C 
55 NU ( 4  nu/uru) 
S f  
I 
1 
1 
P 
? 
P 
? 
13 cints/kUh 
11 rills 
2.51 rillion l Y 9 l  $ 
1.15 riilitn 1991 $ 
I6 
I 
24 
16 
9.19 
1.11 
1.11 
1.35 
1.15 
19.56 rillimn 1914 I 
21.38 rillitn 1991 $ 
1.39 rillinn 1Y91 1 
1.52 illlien 1914 $ 
1.66 rillItn 1991 $ 
381 1991 $ 
3Y.51 
11.34 
1.11 
1.11 
4.41 
55.32 rillion 1984 $ 
C l . 2 4  rillitn 1991 $ 
1.11 rillion 1991 $ 
1195 1991 1 
2.94 rillion 1114 $ 
3 - 2 1  rillion 1991 $ 
11.54 rillion 1991 t 
1.41 rillltn 1991 $ 
14a3 1991 t 
61.51 rillltn 1991 $ 
3 . 0  rillion 1991 $ 
152.64 rillitn 1991 $ 
4.1s rillion 1991 $ 
152.14 
3.25 rillion 1991 $ 
155.19 rillitn 1991 $ 
111.11 
11.11 
1l11.13 rillion 1991 $ 
314.56 rillion l Y 9 l  $ 
29a.94 rillion 1991 $ 
2544.23 rillion 1991 $ 
3354.23 rillion 1998 $ 
1IIIUAL P R O J E C I  0 I I C O S T :  41.54 rillion 1991 $ 
UELLIIELO C l P I T A l  C O S T S  
PRODUCTION E Q U I P l l E N T  
I N J E C T I O R  MUIPNENI 
I E K R A I l  LA80R A O J U S T I E I I  
T E K R l I l l  SITE P R t ? . A D J U S l N t l l l  
C O K S l R U C T I I N  C A R P  
S 1 I T  I 1 A L (UELLfIfLl) 
s u I T  0 1 1  L (UELLIIELO) 
UELlfIELI casr/nu 
UtLLFIELO C t S I / K U  
uti t  I utttiitio o I n cosis 
UELL I U E L L f I E L O  6 I I COSTS 
?OUtK PL1NT C A P I I A L  COSlS 
?OUU PLLIT 
T E K R A I N  L l l O U  1DJUSTNENT 
ltllllll SITE ?REP. 1 O J U S l l E l T  
CONSlRUtlIOI C A N ?  
S 8 I T  0 1 1 L (POUEI ?LANT) 
W E I  ? L I N T  C O S T / I U  
us I B ~ ~ E I ~ R T  
s u I I o I A L (POYEK tinnr) 
POUEI mnr cosrpu 
P L M  o I a cosis  
PLANT 0 I II C O S T S  
?IINT/UELLFIELD C l P I l l L  C O S T S  
PL1NT/UELLfIELO C O S T / l U  
? L I I I T / U E L L F I E L O  C O S I / K U  
UElL DRILL116 C O S l S  
TRAISNISSION LINE C O S T S  
11111 C W f l A L  C O S T S  
P W E R  PLANT I l S E  C O S I :  
TOTAL POUEK ? L A l l  I A f E  COST:  
mi COSTS: 
um 21: c o n r 1 n s E a c v :  
N U N 8 1 1  Of ?OUU ?LAlITS R E E O E O :  
lOlAl COST FOR ? O Y E R  PLA1TS: 
S~811RINf C A B L E  COSTS: 
OVERHEAD lRANSllISSION C O S T S :  
ANNUAL ? K O J I C 1  0 6 I C O S T :  
358 DES C 
5s I U  ( 3  nu/uELL) 
Sf 
I 
1 
1 
I 
H 
I 
Y 
13 ctntr/kUh 
11 riio 
3.0 rilli8n 1 9 9 1  $ 
1.11 rillion 1991 $ 
21 
II 
31 
21 
12.16 
9.39 
1.11 
1.43 
1.65 
23.63 rillion 1984 $ 
25.14 rlllitn 1991 $ 
1.41 rillinn 1998 $ 
2.33 rillion 1914 $ 
2.54 rlllion 1991 $ 
46: 1991 $ 
39.51 
15.51 
1.11 
1.11 
4.41 
11.61 rillltn 1984 $ 
65.99 rillitn 1991 $ 
1.21  rlllion 1991 $ 
I 2 0  1994 $ 
5.36 rillion 1914 $ 
5.14 rillion 1991 $ 
91.12 rillltn 1991 $ 
1.61 rllllon 1991 $ 
1111 1991 $ 
9 l . I I  rillloo 1991 $ 
3.11 rillitn 1991 $ 
185.32 rillion 1991 : 
1.38 rilllon 199) $ 
113.32 
119.32 riillon 1 9 9 1  $ 
221.19 
11.11 
4.11 riiiitn 1 9 9 1  ; 
2211.18 rilllon 1991 
314.56 rillion 1 Y 9 I  $ 
291.94 rillion 1991 t 
2945.31 rilllcn 1991 $ 
4125.38 rillion 199) $ 
13.12 rillltn 199) $ 
IlUIIl Sf81NfRNAL ?1BJEC1 COST fS111Alf S I E f T  
S I  & E l  lEC1UAlT  fLM1 
t WAUAlI C E O l N E R l A L  ?ROJfCT COS1 fS1IlllTE SHEET 
51 IC1 IESAUATT ?LAI1 
U E L L f I f l O  C A P I T l l  COS1S 
? R O O U C T I O I  E (U l? l tNT  
INJftlIBN f0UIMIIT 
lfKRA1I LLBOR 1DJUSTILNl 
I E K R A I I  SITf ?RE?. lOJUSTIEIT 
S I I T  0 1 A L (UfLLfIElO) 
S I I 1  I 1 1 L ( U f L L f l E L l )  
U L L L f I E L D  CQST/nU 
YELLFIELD Ctfl/KU 
coisinutiron CAIP 
YELL 6 YELLf IELD D I II COSlS 
Y E L L  I uutf i t to o I n c e s i s  
19111 0 I I C#STS 
35: OtC c 
55 IU ( 4  IIU/UELL) 
si : ..: 
I 
1 
1 
? 
? 
? 
f 
13 ontc/hUh 
11 l i f 8 S  
2.51 rillinn I991 $ 
1.15 rillion 1991 $ 
16 
I 
2k 
I6 
9.19 
1.11 
1.11 
1.35 
1.65 
19.56 rillion 198k $ 
1.39 rilllrn 1991 $ 
1.52 rillltn 1984 $ 
1.66 rfllitn 1 9 9 1  $ 
21.31 1 i l h  1991 $ 
317 1991 $ 
39.51 
11.31 
1.11 
1.11 
k,k8 
55.32 rilllon 1984 I 
6t .24  rillirn 1991 $ 
1.11 rillion 1991 1 
1l95 1991 $ 
2.94 rilllon 1914 1 
3.21 rillion I991 $ 
11.54 rillltn 1991 $ 
i.4a rillion 1991 : 
1413 1991 $ 
61.11 rillion 1991 $ 
3.61 rilllen 1¶91 $ 
112.64 rillion 1998 I 
4.15 rillion i ¶ 9 l  $ 
152.64 
3.25 rillita 1991 t 
115.89 aiilitn 1991 $ 
212.66 
1t.11 
2026.62 rillion 1991 8 
l l 4 .56  rillita 1Y96 $ 
2¶8.¶4 ril lhn l Y 9 l  t 
t116.12 rillion I991 $ 
3511.62 rillitr 1991 $ 
48.54 rIllien 1996 $ 
UfLLflfLO CAP1111 COSlS 
tRODUtll@II tPUI?IflT 
I I I J E C I I I I  E ) U I ? I W  
I E K R I I I I  L A l O R  ADJUSTI tN l  
TEKRAIN SITE PREP.LOJUSTIElll 
COHSTRUCII~I C A I ?  
S I I T O  1 A L (UELLFIELO) 
s u I 1 I 1  1 L ( U t l l f I f l l )  
UCLLFIEU ctsrinu 
YLLLfIELO cos1/1u 
UELL C UELLf lELO I I I COSTS 
ULLL 6 YfLLfIELO I 6 I COSlS 
351 It8 c 
55 IU ( 3  I U / U t l L )  
Sf 
I 
1 
I 
n 
n 
ti 
Y 
13 ctntt/tUh 
11 riltc 
3.11 rillitn 1991 $ 
1.11 rillion 1991 $ 
21 
11 
31 
21 
12.16 
9.39 
1.11 
1.43 
1.65 
23.63 rillion 1914 $ 
25.14 rillinn I Y 9 l  $ 
1.41 rlllitn 1991 $ 
2.33 rillitn 1914 t 
2.54 rlllinn 1 9 9 1  $ 
468 1¶91 $ 
39.51 
15.51 
1.11 
1.11 
4.48 
61.61 rillion 1914 $ 
65.99 rillion 1911 t 
1 . 2 1  rillion 1991 $ 
1210 1991 I 
5.36 rillion I914 $ 
5.14 rillitn 1991 $ 
81.12 rillion 1991 $ 
1.61 riliitn 1991 $ 
1668 1931 $ 
91.11 rilllen 19¶1 $ 
3.61 rillion 1991 $ 
115.12 rillinn I991 $ 
1.31 rillion 1991 $ 
115.32 
4.11 riliitn 1991 $ 
llcJ.32 rillltn 1991 $ 
246.12 
11.11 
2461.11 rillion 1 9 9 1  $ 
374.56 rillita 1991 $ 
291.94 tilllon 1Y9l $ 
3134.11 rillion 1991 $ 
13lk.11 rillirn 1991 $ 
13.12 rillion 1991 $ 
APPENDIX C 
CRITICISM, REVIEW AND COMMENTS ON THE 
FEBRUARY, 1988 
DECISION ANALYSTS HAWAII, INC. REPORT 
II I i 
t 
i t 
Alex Sifford is currently Geothermal Program Manager for the Resource 
Development Division of the Oregon Department of Energy. The following are 
comments from his review of the February 1988 Decision Analysts Hawaii, Inc. 
report on the Economic Feasibility of the Hawaii Geothermal and Cable project. 
Comments concerning the February 1988 Hawaii Department of Business 
and Economic Development Economic Feasibility Analysis regarding the proposed 
Hawaii Geothermal Project. 
(On resource quality) 
A high temperature resource is not necessarily a high quality 
resource. Hawaii has a high temperature resource but its 
quality is as yet unproven. Problems with seawater intrusion, 
silica and mineral content, unknown long-term production 
capability, and inherent development dangers reduce the quality 
potential considerably. 
Pg P-1 
(last 
paragraph) 
(On overall system planning) 
To say the inclusion of Maui in the system would have no effect 
on its economic feasibility is unsubstantiated. Experience in 
the Pacific Northwest has shown interties can be difficult and 
expensive if not considered early in the system planning 
process. 
Pg ES-2 
(first 
paragraph) 
Pg ES-2 
(third 
paragraph) 
Pg ES-3 
(mid-page 
table) 
Pg ES-7 
(second 
paragraph) 
Pg 1-2 
(last 
paragraph) 
Pg IV-3 
(first 
paragraph) 
(On who benefits) 
Apparently all the geothermal power will to go Oahu. Does the 
Big Island get nothing? 
(On plant sizing) 
To produce 500 net MW of power, plants must be sized to allow 
for approximately 10% loss in generation and transmission. 
(On development schedules) 
Realistically, geothermal companies would develop the resource 
in stages since it can be so variable and costly. Full and 
rapid development, in light of The Geysers experience, is not a 
logical approach. 
(On plant construction time) 
The report indicates it is conservative in terms of size of 
plants and pace of development but states its plants will be 
built in half the time or less than construction time estimates 
by Stone & Webster Engineers of Denver, Colorado who are well 
experienced at design and construction. 
(On steam gathering system costs) 
Bechtel figures for a steamgathering system is closer 
to $7 million. 
Pg IV-3 
(powerplan t 
section) 
Pg IV-4 
(second 
paragraph) 
Pg IV-4 
(last 
paragraph) 
Pg IV-5 
(second 
paragraph) 
Pg IV-5 
(third 
paragraph) 
Pg IV-6 
(third 
paragraph) 
.. 
. 
Pg IV-8 
(sixth 
paragraph) 
Pg IV-9 
(fourth 
paragraph) 
Pg IV-12 
(first 
paragraph) 
(On power plant costs) 
Based on Oregon Department of Energy studies, actual cost per 
kilowatt is for 25 MW is between $1600 and $l$OO. The 
$l,loo/kW in the report ($27.734 million divided by 25 MW) is 
very low. 
(On well development) 
Ten months for well development is extremely optimistic. 
At 13 wells per plant it allows less than one month per well. 
Six weeks seems more likely. 
(On well O&M costs) 
The $58,000 per well O&M cost is unsubstantiated and seems very 
low. Our own (Oregon Dept. of Energy) estimates show a 
$2OO,OOO to $goo,000 per well range for O&M. 
(On waste disposal costs) 
The chemical and waste disposal costs are unsubstantiated 
How are these costs estimated on an undefined resource? 
(On costs in general) 
Where is the contingency cost for undefined resource. A 
contingency is only logical given what little is known about 
the resource. 
(On locating the plants) 
Where are the maps showing volcanic activity and proposed plant 
locations? 
(On insurance costs) 
Insurance would be extraordinarily high due to risks. 
The figure 03% seems low. 
(On financing) 
Twenty-four years is too long for financing. Seven years is 
more likely. 
(On risk to investors) 
Major sources of risk and uncertainty are not greatly reduced 
since the development scenario is not logically staged. 
L 
Carl Freedman is a utility economist living in Hawaii. He currently serves 
as Vice President of Legal Affairs and Board Member of the Blue Ocean Society. 
He is formerly a member of the Oregon Environmental Action Group 'Forelaws 
On Board' and played an integral part in that groups examination and analysis of 
the proposed Pebble Springs Nuclear Facility. He has been a major participant and 
contributor in many comprehensive studies on conservation and alternate energy 
systems. The following is his assessment and critique of the February 1988 Decision 
Analysts Hawaii, Inc. report on the economic feasibility of the proposed Hawaii 
Geothermal and Cable Project. 
AN ASSESSMENT AND CRITIQUE OF: 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
ECONOMIC FEASIBILITY ANALYSIS 
REGARDING THE HAWAIX GEOTHERMAL/UNDERWATER CABLE PROJECT 
PREPARED BY CARL FREEDMAN 
12/4/89 
BACKGROUND 
L 
The State or' Hawaii and the Hawaii Electric Company (HECO) are 
undertaking an aggressively accelerated program to develop 500 
megawatts of geothermal electrical generating capacity on the 
island of Hawaii in conjunction with a deep underwater and 
overland transmission system to transport the generated energy to 
the island of Oahu. The Hawaii'Department of Business and Economic 
Development (DBED) has taken a lead role in the promotion of this 
enterprise. 
conclusions that the geothermal/cable Project is economically 
feasible. A preliminary study was published in April of 1986: 
"Alternative Approaches to the Legal, Institutional and Financial 
Aspects of Developing an Inter-Island Electrical Transmission 
System,." prepared by Gerald A. Sumida et al. Subsequently, a 
study was commissioned to address economic concerns more 
specifically: "Undersea Cable to Transmit Geothermal-Generated 
Electrical Energy from the Island of Hawaii to Oahu: Economic 
Feasibility,'' prepared by Decision Analysts Hawaii, Inc., 
published in February, 1988. This latter study (DAH1 study) is the 
basis for the projected capital costs of the geothermal/cable 
Project of $ 1.7 billion. 
Proposals to private industrial consortia to sollcit proposed 
schemes to build, finance and manage the geothermal/cable Project. 
Four or five consortia have responded with proposals which are 
being reviewed by HECO and a consulting firm. A condition in the 
request for proposals was that the projected delivered cost of 
energy to Oahu would be at or below HSCO's avoided cost of energy. 
DBED has commissioned studies which provide the basis for its 
The Hawaiian Electric Company (HECO) issued Requests for 
According to DBED literature the project would be 
built and owned by a private corporate entity (or entlt'ies.) The 
project owner would (according to DBED's interpretation) bear all 
of the financial risks of project cost overrims or generation and 
transmission problems. Rcvcriues for the project would be provided 
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by a contract with HECO, binding Heco to purchase power delivered 
by the project to Oahu. 
CONCERNS REGARDING PROJECT ECONOMICS AND FINANCING 
According to the best published hopes of DBED and HECO the 
geothermal/cable project could be built, financed and operated 
without costs or risks to ratepayers or taxpayers above what it 
would cost to generate electrical energy with oil-fired 
facilities. Ignoring all of the environmental, social, 
archeological, health and aesthetic issues not addressed by 
current economic analyses, this would be a welcome reassurance to 
residents of the state regarding the vulnerability of their 
pocketbooks. 
Careful analysis of the DAH1 study, however, indicates that 
the projected costs of building and financing the geothermal/cable 
project have been substantially underestimated and improperly 
compared to HECO's avoided cost's (see discussion below.) This 
raises concerns over the cost impacts to Hawaiian residents which 
are potentially enormous. The details regarding how the proposals 
solicited by HECO will be assessed and the particular language and 
terms included in any subsequent proposed contracts are of crucial 
importance. 
(1) Will the proposals solicited by HECO indicate project 
costs greater than HECO's avoided costs? If so, will the project 
still be considered by HECO? 
(2) Will the proposals solicited by HECO propose to meet 
avoided costs by transferring financial risks to ratepayers, 
taxpayers, or utility stockholders ? 
(3) Will the proposals solicited by HECO incorporate low- 
ball bids in anticipation of later re-negotiation or litigation? 
Ostensibly, according to intended planned contractual 
arrangements, the ratepayers are to be insulated from costs 
exceeding HECO's avoided costs. Much previous experience with 
over-budget and non-functional electrical generation projects on 
the mainland has demonstrated that this promise may be a costly 
illusion. Corporations that have invested billions of dollars in a 
generating project in response to requests by the State of Hawaii 
and HECO are not going to absorb large cost overruns without 
litigating the matter tooth and nail in the courts. Contracts 
arranged on the basis proposed by DBED are not likely to be 
enforceable. 
It is of paramount importance for these reasons to insure that 
any contractual agreements made by HECO, the State of Hawaii, or 
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project consortia be examined very carefully to insure 
are based upon sound and reasonable economic assumptio 
may end up being economic 
ratepayers and/or taxpayers. 
proposed projects will only be successful if they are 
actually economically prudent, regardless of any contr 
schemes or promises. 
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OVERVIEW 
Currently, DBED's economic projections of the economics of the 
geothermal/cable project are based upon the study by Decision 
Analysts Hawaii, Inc. published in February of 1988. 
The study assumes that the cable and transmission system will 
be built and financed by one private corporate "venture" and that 
the geothermal wells and generation' facilities will be built by 
another similar venture, perhaps under the ownership of a common 
larger corporation. Estimates are made of the costs of building 
the various components of the geothermal/cable project based upon 
other studies and by scaling costs from other projects. 
establishes schedules of year by year expenditures, revenues, and 
bond sales and payments. The schedules are discounted to present 
values and are compared with estimates of present values of HECO's 
avoided fuel, operating and capital costs. By various indicators 
of venture profitability, break-even fuel oil cost and cost to 
benefit ratios, the costs of the geothermal are evaluated as being 
economically feasible. 
Though the study is rigorous in its treatment of cash flows 
and discounting methodologies, it makes s o m e  s i m p l e  errors that 
are of significant consequence to the outcome of its conclusions. 
The study assumes 100% availability factors for geothermal 
generation and transmission. No transmission losses are accounted 
for. Assumptions are made regarding financing methodologies that 
are inconsistent with conventional experience and would not in 
certain instances be legal without legislative actions. Real 
generation capital cost escalation is ignored, Capital costs are 
in certain instances substantially underestimated. Certain methods 
of scaling generation plant capital costs are misapplied. 
The study 
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CRITIQUE 
GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION AVAILABILITY 
The text of the DAHI study acknowledges that generation and 
transmission facilities will have some required maintenance and 
outage time. In the actual arithmetic of revenue calculations used 
in the study, however, no such adjustment is made. Revenues are 
calculated based upon 500 MW of power output for 8760 hours per 
year (100% availability.) The study states at one point in the 
text that each 25 MW geothermal generation plant will be built to 
27.5 MW capacity to account for maintenance time, however, no such 
adjustment was actually made to the capital cost or operating 
expenses used in the calculations. The calculations used in the 
study assume 100% availability and 100% capacity factors for 
geothermal, transmission and AC-DC conversion facilities. 
There is no such thing in the world of electrical power 
generation as a plant operating at 100% availability. Planned 
maintenance and unplanned outages are inevitable. Transmission 
system outage percentages are typically quite small, but would be 
additive to generation outage times. A 90% overall availability 
would be very optimistic for a geothermal/cable system. This 
statistic is important because it directly and proportionately 
effects the amount of energy delivered by the geothermal/cable 
system and the revenues accrued by the geothermal/cable ventures. 
TRANSMISSION LOSSES 
The DAHI study compares the costs of geothermal generation on 
the island of Hawaii to meet Oahu's needs with local generation on 
Oahu. Although the study mentions in its text that revenue 
calculations are based upon delivered energy to Oahu (rather than 
generated energy) there is no accounting 'of transmission losses 
anywhere in the actual calculations of revenue or generation 
costs. Revenue is calculated based upon delivering 500 MW of power 
to Oahu 100% of the time, generated by 500 MW of capacity on 
Hawaii. Transmission losses directly and proportionately effect 
the amount of delivered energy and accrued revenues of the 
geothermal/cable venture. Transmission losses are typically at 
least 10% for a system like the one proposed in this project. 
ECONOMY OF SCALE CALCULATIONS 
The DAHI study estimates the costs of a series of twenty power 
plants of 25 MW capacity. The costs for these plants are "scaled" 
from the documented costs of 12.5 MW plants. The concept used in 
scaling is that a larger plant is cheaper per MW because of the 
economy of scale. A boiler twice as big costs  less than twice as 
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much. The formula used in the DAHI study is the ' l . 6  power" rule 
which is commonly used in scaling generation facility capital 
costs. According to this formula a 25 MW plant costs 51.6% more 
than a 12.5 MW plant. Th 
scaling capital costs. 
power plants into clusters of fours and reduces the costs of the 
second and forth plants in each group to 70% of the scaled cost 
and reduces the third plant to 80% of the scaled cost. The logic 
used is that the plants will be close enough together that they 
can share certain of their facilities and thus net cost savings. 
The net capital costs for the network of generating facilities is 
reduced by this treatment of costs to an average of 80% of the 
previously scaled costs. This treatment is not conventional. It is 
especially not appropriate in this instance because of other 
assumptions made in the analysis. In the section of the study that 
addresses risks due to geological hazards it is stressed that the 
plants are distributed widely to avoid damage to more than one 
plant at a time due to lave flows. This is a very sensitive 
assumption because it is the basis for conclusions made by the 
study that there would be no loss  in system net output and no loss 
in revenues due to geologic hazards (a possible loss of one 
plant.) Grouping the plants close enough to benefit from 
s an appropriate application of 
The DAHI study goes further than this, however. It groups the 
of scale is not consistent with this assumption. 
Additionally, the DAHI study uses the same .6 power rule to 
scale the capital costs of wellfield steam-gathering equipment as 
it uses to scale generation plant equipment. This is 
inappropriate. Steam-gathering equipment does not become less 
expensive per MW for a larger field than for a smaller one 
according to a . 6  power rule. If anything, much of the costs per 
MW increase as wellfield size increases because of the longer 
average distances between each well and the power plant. A smaller 
power plant is located in a smaller wellfield and is consequently 
relatively close to the wells that supply It. A s  the size of a 
power plant increases, the size of the wellfield dedicated to the 
plant increases and the average distance-of each well to the power 
plant increases. Steam-gathering piping costs increase as the 
average distance to the power plant increases. This principle 
dictates that the cost per MW for steam gathering piping increases 
as the size of the power plant increases. The DAHI study 
erroneously makes the opposite assumption and calculates the cost 
of a 25 MW steam-gathering system by decreasinq the costs per MW 
of steam gathering equipment according to the .6 power rule from 
assumption noted above that plants will be grouped in clusters of 
four closely enough to benefit from economies of scale would 
further aggravate the need for even longer and consequently more 
expensive steam-gathering equipment. 
, the documented costs for 12.5 MW plant equipment. Furthermore, the 
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WELLFIELD COSTS 
Perhaps the most sensitive single set of assumptions regarding 
the costs of the geothermal/cable venture are the estimates of the 
costs of drilling a productive wellfield. Approximately one third 
of the total project costs are in the wellfield. The primary 
factor effecting wellfield costs is the number of wells necessary 
to develop the required thermal energy for generation purposes. 
Some of the wells drilled would be productive. Some would be used 
for fluid re-injection. Some would be dry, or too hot or cool. 
Some would need to be replaced'over'the life of the facility. The 
DAHI study assumes that 13 wells, plus eight replacement wells, 
will be required for each 25 MW plant. This equates to 
useable/non-useable ratio of 5:l. This ratio may be very 
optimistic for Hawaii geology. 
Although DBED and the DAHI study repeatedly state that 
geothermal resources are a proven and reliable resource, there is 
really very little experience in areas geologically similar to 
Hawaii (a live volcano.) Hawaii is a hot, and therefore a 
potentially efficient resource; but'it is also a very young, 
active and potentially unstable geological region. The area of the 
world with the most similar geology that has operating experience 
with geothermal wells is Iceland. There the experience with 
geothermal electrical generation has not been good. The geology 
seems to be too active, effecting the success rates of the wells 
dramatically. The project there required 24 wells to be drilled to 
obtain 11 that were useable. It remains to be seen how many 
replacement wells will be necessary. Iceland experienced problems 
with wells "pinching off" rendering them unusable and did not 
attain the sustahed power levels that were anticipated. The 
second unit of the planned two-unit geothermal generation facility 
there has been abandoned because of the wellfield problems and 
expenses. 
Without much experience with Hawaiian geology, predicting the 
productivity and success rate of wells is quite conjectural. The 
wellfield success rate assumed in the DAHI study is perhaps 
possible, but must certainly be categorized as quite optimistic. 
These assumptions effect the certainty of any economic predictions 
dramatically. 
CAPITAL COST ESTIMATES 
The DAH1 study is consistently optimistic about estimates of 
capital costs. The cost estimate for AC-DC conversion stations, , 
for example, is S 72 million. According to current estimates from 
B.C. Hydro, the costs would be $250 per KW for each station, 
totalling S 250 million. The DAHI cost estimate for the entire 
transmission system including the underwater cables, overhead 
lines, pumping stations and AC-DC conversion station is $ 413.3 
million. 
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The geothermal/cable project incorporates several aspects of 
new unproven technologies in new untried areas of geological and 
geographical extremes. 
magnitude it is prudent 
contingency costs to include what is more a probability than a 
possibility of project delays, technical problems and cost 
overruns. No such contingencies are considered by the study. 
n in conventiona1,projects of this 
r planning purposes to include 
REAL COST ESCALATION 
In order to calculate HECO's future avoided costs DAHI 
escalates the real cost of fuel oil according to the average of a 
series of estimates of future oil prices. The real escalation of 
fuel prices is substantial. (Real cost escalation is the increase 
over and above that due to inflation.) These avoided fuel costs 
are compared directly with various costs of geothermal generation. 
The study does not make the appropriate analogous accounting of 
the real cost escalation of plant capital costs. (Geothermal 
generation costs are primarily-capital costs.) Historical 
experience indicates that real plant capital costs escalate faster 
than real fuel prices during periods of real fuel price increases. 
Utility planners know, for example, that their older plants were 
less expensive to build than their newer plants, even in terms of 
real costs. (This may not be true in operating or fuel costs, 
however.) Because the DAHI study is comparative in nature, the 
differences in the treatment of cost escalation skew the results 
in favor of the geothermal/cable venture. 
FINANCING 
The DAHI study assumes that the cable and transmission system 
will be financed with Hawaii Special Purpose Revenue Bonds 
(Industrial Development Bonds) at a rate ,5% above municipal bond 
rates. The geothermal venture is assumed to flcjat bonds at the Aaa 
corporate rate. At the same time the study maintains that a l l  
financial risks due to cost over-runs or resource failure are to 
be borne by these financing sources. These are clearly not 
realistic assumptions. 
non-regulated private corporate use. 
Hawaii Special Purpose Revenue Bonds are not available for 
The assumptlon that the geothermal/cable venture can be 
financed by bonds issued at such low interest rates with such a 
substantial assumption of risk is inappropriate, especially in a 
comparative study of this nature. The costs of financing 
appreciably effect the profitability equation used in the DAHI 
study. 
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS 
, 
Throughout the DAHI study estimates and calculated numbers are 
associated with standard deviations to imply confidence intervals 
around the predicted statistics. This sort of analysis has its 
place in the laboratory, in demographics and perhaps around casino 
gambling tables. The use of confidence intervals in a study of 
this nature which is designed to be used by policy decision- 
makers is inappropriate and misleading. To a person familiar with 
statistics these numbers may be of some value, but to imply to a 
decision-maker who may rely on the study that the values ascribed 
to the confidence intervals are realistic indicators of the 
possibility of error of the study is ludicrous. 
Even from a purely statistical viewpoint the sensitivity 
analysis is misapplied. This type of analysis is only appropriate 
when all of the input parameters are truly independent of one 
another and are normally distributed. Neither of these conditions 
are met in a construction project where delays in one portion of 
the project can effect scheduling and costs of other portions and 
where the potential for cost overruns exceed the margin of 
potential cost savings. 
Furthermore, the sensitivity analysis only takes into account 
one particular type of error. It ignores the types of errors noted 
above,cwhich are incremental, but when taken as a whole 
substantially effect the outcome of the analysis. The omission by 
the DAHI study of any consideration of transmission losses and 
availability factors effects the overall calculations in the cost 
comparison by at least 21X, and depending on actual achieved 
availability factors, perhaps by 46% or more. 
Approximate percentage impacts to the DAHI study projected 
costs are listed below to give some idea of the magnitude of their 
importance. These numbers are not intended as correction factors 
to adjust the DAHI study results to draw more accurate 
conclusions. They are included here to demonstrate the sensitivity 
of the DAHI study to its own oversights and biases. All figures 
are percentages of the total geothermal/cable project 
costs/revenues. 
The cumulative percentage statistics below are only for order- 
of-magnitude comparison purposes. The high-end statistics may 
include some double-counting as, for example, in the case of 
generation availability being improved by additional wellfield 
improvements. 
i 
GENERATION AND TRANSMISSION AVAILABILITY 10 - 30% 
TRANSMISSION LOSSES 10 - 12% 
CLUSTERING CAPITAL COST REDUCTIONS 6% 
SCALING STEAM-GATHERING SYSTEM 6% 
WELLFIELD COSTS - (AS IN ICELAND) 10 - 20% 
CONVERTER STATION ACTUAL COSTS ' 8% 
CAPITAL COST ESCALATION 4% 
FINANCING BOND RATES 5 - 10% 
CUMULATIVE 76 - 143% 
These statistics indicate that the DAH1 study includes errors 
and oversights that substantially effect the outcome of its 
conclusions, well in excess of the confidence intervals implied in 
its sensitivity analysis. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The proposed geothermal/cable project is a very large and 
expensive project with an enormous potential to impact the economy 
of the State of Hawaii. Currently existing economic analyses do 
not establish a sound basis for confidence in the ultimate cost- 
effectiveness of the project. Very careful scrutiny must be given 
to the details of proposed project bids  and contractual 
arrangements to assure that financial risks and the costs of 
project failures or overruns will not be assumed by Hawaii's 
ratepayers or taxpayers or HECO's stockholders. 
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APPENDIX D 
ROBERT J. MOWRIS REPORT 
APPENDIX E 
COSTS IF PRODUCTION WELL INCREASES 
TO 200% REPLACEMENT 
AVERA6E KUH COST OF ELECTRICITY OVER 4t YEARS I F  SttNU O F  OTHER GENERATIN6 CAPACITY I S  AODED TO EXIST ING CAPACITY U S I N 6  A 199t ELECTRICITY USE l N D  COST ESTINATE AS A B lSE 
(3/1 U e l l  Replacement) 
(24 t Contingency) 
€ X I S T I N 6  SYSTEN 
(199t) 
lt,151,28t,ttt T o t a l  kUh Capacity 
8,264,319,321 U i t h  23% Reserve 
613,914,852 t Operating Revenue 
8,264,319,321 Annual kUh Sold 
1.43 Average Cents/kUh 
6EOTHERllAL ADDEO CA?lCITY 
L ow (251U PLANTS) 
(4 t Years) 
13,21t,ttt,ttt $ P r o j e c t  Cost 
ltl, 791 ,#tt,Itt kUh Sold 
13.14 Average Cents/kUh 
U i t h  Royal ty 
CON8INED CAPACITY 
(It Years) 
31,828,994,tll 4 Operat ing Revenue 
4t8,117,445,3@6 kUh Sold 
9.25 Average Cents/kWh 
Cents/kUh Increase 
I 
I 
it,nv,2at,ttt I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
WI6H I 
I 
ltl,19l,ttt,1tt I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
8,264,319,327 I 
613,914,852 I 
8,264,319,321 I 
1 . 4 3  I 
6EOTHERNAL I 
16,56t,ttt, ttt I 
16.21 I 
41,118,994,tll I 
4tB,111,t45,3t6 I 
11.16 I 
1.63 U i t h  Added Capacity 2.63 I 
I 
Cents/kUh t Increase I 
24.61 U i t h  Added Capacity 35.43 I 
EXISTING SYSTEM 
(199t) 
lt,151,28t,W Tots1 kUh Capacity 
8,264,379,327 U i t h  231 Reserve 
613,911,852 t Operating Revenue 
6,264,319,321 l nnua l  kUh Sold 
1.43 Average Cents/kUh 
6EOTHERMAL ADDED c m c I i y  
LOU (51NU PLANTS) 
( I t  Y e a r s )  
12,t3t,tM,Ott Pro jec t  Cost 
98,613,ttB,ttt kUh Sold 
12.11 Average Cents/kUh 
U i t h  Royalty 
C016111EO CAPACITY 
(4t Years) 
36,588,994,t11 t Operating Revenue 
4t6,409,169,4t9 kUh Seld 
9.0 Average Ccnts/kUh 
Cents / kUh I ncr case 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
HI6H I 
I 
lS,+lt,.tt,ttt I 
I 
15.19 I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
4t6,4a9,169,1tg I 
I 
I 
I 
lt,151,28t,Ott I 
8,264,319,321 1 
613,914,852 I 
0,264,319,321 I 
1.43 I 
GEOTHERNAL I 
98,613,ttt,tt1 I 
39,568,994,#11 I 
9.13 I 
1.51 U i t h  Added Capacity 2.31 i 
I 
CentslkUh t Increase I 
21.2t U l t h  Added Capacity 31.12 I 
E X I S T I N 6  SYSTER 
(1991) 
lt,151,28t,ttt To ta l  kUh Capacity 
8,264,379,321 U i t h  23t Reserve 
613,914,852 t Operating Rrvtnae 
1,264,319,321 Annual kUh Sold 
1.13 Average Cents/kUh 
S O l A R / O I l  ADDED CAPICITY 
(1ttNU PLANTS) 
(41 Y e a r s )  
lt,614,ttt,ttt t Pro jec t  Cost 
98,112,ttt,ttt kUh Seld 
1t.81 Average Cents/kUh 
U i t h  Royal ty 
CONBINEO CAPACITY 
(4 t Year#) 
35,161,994,t11 : Operating Revenue 
4tS,9St,Cl9,119 kUh Sold  
8.66 Average Ctnts/kWh 
lt,151,28t,ttt 
8,264,319,32l 
613,914,852 
1,264,319,321 
1.13 
011 
8.13 
33,128,994,071 
4t5,95t, 619, 1 t9 
8.16 
Cents/kUh Increase 
1.23 U i t h  ldded Capacity t.13 
Ctnts/kUh ; Increase 
16.6; U i t h  Added Capacity 9.8t 
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